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LARRY ALEXANDER and EMILY SHERWIN
DECEPTION IN MORALITY AND LAW
(Accepted 15 December 2002)
Deception, by which we mean words or conduct intended to induce
false beliefs in others, plays a complex role in human life. Well-
socialized people revere honesty and disapprove of lying and other
forms of deception. At the same time, well-socialized people engage
in deception, regularly and skillfully, not only for altruistic reasons
but also to gain advantages over others.1 We know how to suggest
false facts through words, conduct, and concealment. Most people,
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1 See, e.g., Charles V. Ford, Lies, Lies, Lies: The Psychology of Deceit (1996),
pp. 4–18 (documenting the prevalence of lying in sex, employment, advertising,
politics, medicine, and science); Carolyn Saarni and Michael Lewis, “Deceit and
Illusion in Human Affairs”, in Michael Lewis and Carolyn Saarni (eds.), Lying
and Deception in Everyday Life (1993), pp. 1, 8 (“deception, lying, falsehood,
and masking of our inner selves exist as part of the social world in which we
live”).
On the development of skills of deception in children, see David Nyberg, The
Varnished Truth: Truth Telling and Deceiving in Ordinary Life (1992), pp. 166–
171; Michael Lewis, “The Development of Deception”, in Lying and Deception
in Everyday Life, supra, at p. 90. For examples of deceptive behavior by animals,
see Ford, supra, at pp. 50–52. Deception is clearly adaptive. An accomplished
deceiver will have greater success in evading predators and resisting human
combatants than a person who lacks this skill. Cf. Sun Tzu, The Art of War,
Samuel B. Griffith (trans.) (1963), pp. 97–98:
Ss_-ma I [preparing to attack Chu-ko Liang’s city] said: ‘Chu-ko Liang is in the
city; his troops are few; he is not strong. His generals and officers have lost heart.’
At this time Chu-ko Liang’s spirits were high as usual. He ordered his troops to
lay down their banners and silence their drums, and did not allow his men to go
out. He opened the four gates and swept and sprinkled the streets.
Ss_-ma I suspected an ambush, and led his army in haste to the Northern
Mountins.
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especially those who are socially successful, also have a highly
developed sense of when to mislead and when not to mislead.
Against this contradictory background, we shall compare the
treatment of deception in moral theory and in law.2 We begin with
a brief look at moral philosophy as it pertains to deception. We
then turn to law, surveying a variety of legal rules regulating decep-
tion and noting as well some instances in which the legal system
itself is deceptive. Our survey is not exhaustive, but it allows us
to draw some general conclusions about the attitude of law toward
deception.
Prevailing moral theories strongly condemn at least one form of
deception: false assertion, otherwise known as lying. Law initially
appears to take an even stronger stance, forbidding both lying
and non-lying forms of deception. Behind these general proscrip-
tions, however, are more detailed doctrinal rules that often tolerate
deceptive practices, including lies. The pattern of these rules
diverges substantially from the logic of prevailing deontological
moral theories. Although the legal rules are logically consistent
with consequentialist theories, they also stop short of the degree of
condemnation that consequentialists typically recommend.
The comparative lenience of law toward deception can be
explained in several ways. One possibility is that the costs of regula-
tion are simply too high. A second, related explanation is that
the legal system is less effective at regulating deception than is
spontaneous private ordering that works through mechanisms of
disapproval and reputation. A third explanation is that law tolerates
deception because deception can be beneficial. In other words, in
some instances the problem may not be the difficulty of regulation,
but a lack of desire to regulate. To the extent this last explanation is
correct, it is further evidence of a divergence between law and moral
theory, at least in its non-consequentialist forms.
Chu-ko remarked to his Chief of Staff: ‘Ss_-ma I thought I had prepared an
ambush and fled along the mountain ranges.’ Ss_-ma I later learned of this and
was overcome with regrets.
2 For an interesting recent analysis of law and morality in criminal law, see
Stuart P. Green, “Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts
Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements”, Hastings L. J. 53 (2001),
p. 157.
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We conclude with a further observation about legal regulation
of deception. Assuming that legal rules reflect some ambivalence
toward deception, law must also sensitive to both the importance
and the fragility of the norm of truthfulness. The need to reinforce
this norm, and the odd relationship between truth and deception,
help to explain the discrepancy between legal rhetoric and legal
enforcement.
I. MORALITY
A. The Wrong of Lying
Moral theory typically focuses on lying. A lie, strictly defined, is a
statement, verbal or non-verbal, of a proposition that the speaker
believes to be false, but that the speaker intends the audience to
take as a proposition the speaker believes to be true. Lying in this
sense is widely condemned as wrong, but opinions differ as to why.
Leading arguments hold either that lying is wrong in itself or that
lying results in harm that is grave enough to support a near-absolute
prohibition.3
A lie may, of course, cause direct harm to the interests of the
person lied to.4 Lies create false beliefs, which the believer may act
on to his detriment. When the liar profits from such an act, the result
3 In his Tanner Lecture on lying, Alisdair MacIntyre distinguishes “two rival
moral traditions with respect to truth-telling and lying, one for which a lie is
primarily an offense against trust and one for which it is primarily an offense
against truth.” Alasdair MacIntyre, “Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers:
What Can We Learn from Mill and Kant?”, in Grete B. Peterson (ed.), The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, vol. 16 (1995), pp. 307, 336. We are indebted to
MacIntyre’s analysis; however, we are unable to reduce major moral theories of
lying to just two distinctive themes.
MacIntyre himself attempts to reconcile insights from both traditions in an
argument that “the evil of lying . . . consists in its capacity for corrupting and
destroying the integrity of rational relationships.” Ibid., at p. 355. Similarly,
Robert Solomon suggests that “[l]ying is wrong because it constitutes a breach
of trust, which is not a principle but a very particular and personal relationship
between people.” Robert C. Solomon, “What a Tangled Web: Deception and Self-
Deception in Philosophy”, in Lying and Deception in Everyday Life, supra note
1, at pp. 30, 40.
4 An example of an analysis of lying based on harm to the interests of the
addressee is Hugo Grotius, “On the Law of War and Peace”, Francis W. Kelsey
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is akin to theft.5 In itself, however, this explanation of the wrong
of lying yields a rather weak prohibition against lying, because it
leaves open the possibility of benevolent lies, lies in self-defense,
lies to avoid greater evils, and lies to those who by reason of inca-
pacity or wrongdoing are not entitled to truth.6 Accordingly, moral
theorists have sought additional reasons why lying should generally
be viewed as wrong.
The strictest deontological theories hold that lying is intrinsically
wrong, on one of several grounds. St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas, inspired by Aristotle, maintained that lying is contrary to
the laws of nature. God endowed men with the power of speech as
a means for expressing their thoughts. As a result, asserting what
one does not believe is inescapably sinful, regardless of motive or
effect.7
Kant also held that lying, defined as false assertion, is absolutely
wrong. In Kant’s view, false assertion is “directly opposed to the
natural purposiveness of the speaker’s capacity to communicate his
thoughts”; therefore the liar “throws away and, as it were, annihi-
(trans.) (1925), pp. 613–622 (noting, however, that truthfulness is ideal). See
Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (1978), at pp. 19–20
(discussing the impact of a lie on the addressee’s choices).
5 See Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, in C. K. Ogden (ed.)
(1931), p. 170 (fraud “borders on theft”).
6 See Grotius, supra note 4, at pp. 614–619.
7 See Augustine, “Against Lying”, in R. J. Deferrari (ed.), Treatises on Various
Subjects (1952), p. 16 (“he has brought forth a universal proposition, saying:
‘Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie’ ”); Thomas Aquinas, 41 Summa Theo-
logiae 2a2ae, 110, 3, in T. C. O’Brien (ed.) (1971), pp. 157–159 (“Words by their
nature being signs of thought, it is contrary to their nature and out of order for
anyone to convey in words something other than what he thinks”). See also Aris-
totle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, 1127a28–30, Martin Ostwald (trans.) (1962)
(“Falsehood is base in its own right and deserves blame”). Augustine and Aquinas
differed on whether a lie necessarily entails intent to deceive. Aquinas held that
intent to deceive is not required, a position that indicates strict reliance on the
inherent wrongfulness of lying without regard to the position of those who are
deceived by the lie. Aquinas, supra, at p. 149. Although Augustine and Aquinas
viewed all lies as sinful, both drew distinctions among lies, some being more
wrongful than others. Augustine, “On Lying”, in Treatises on Various Subjects,
vol. 14, supra; Aquinas, supra, pp. 153–155.
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lates his dignity as a human being.”8 It follows that lying is an
offense to all humanity and, most importantly, to the liar himself.
To illustrate the absolute character of the moral imperative not to
lie, Kant gave the notorious example of lying to a murderer who
asks about the whereabouts of his intended victim: in Kant’s view,
the lie is wrong.9
More recently, some have made a linguistic argument against
lying that echoes Scholastic and Kantian views. An assertion, by
definition, implies truth. Therefore lying, because it violates a
universal and constitutive rule of language use, is always wrong.10
Another form of argument locates the wrong of lying in harm
to the victim’s autonomy. A successful lie distorts the reasoning
process of the person lied to, displacing his will and manipulating
his action for the speaker’s ends.11 The liar thus fails to respect
the victim’s capacity for reasoned self-governance. On this view,
the false belief a lie creates is cause for complaint in itself, even
if the victim suffers no further effects. An autonomy-based theory
of lying, however, may not rule out all lies: the strength of the
prohibition depends on whether respect for autonomy is viewed
as an absolute imperative or an ideal that may give way to other
values.12
8 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Roger Sullivan (ed.), Mary
Gregor (trans.) (1996), p. 182.
9 Immanuel Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent
Motives”, in Thomas K. Abbott (ed. and trans.), Kant’s Critique of Practical
Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics (1898), pp. 361, 362–363.
10 See, e.g., Mary Catherine Gormally, “The Ethical Root of Language”, in
Peter Geach (ed.), Logic and Ethics (1991), p. 49. For discussion of this view, see
MacIntyre, supra note 3, at pp. 311–313.
11 See, e.g., Christine Korsgaard, “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with
Evil”, Phil. and Pub. Affairs 15 (1986), pp. 325, 330–337, 446–449 (explaining
and qualifying Kant’s absolute prohibition against lying based on his Formula of
Humanity and Kingdom of Ends); David S. Strauss, “Persuasion, Autonomy, and
Freedom of Speech”, Colum. L. Rev. 91 (1991), pp. 334, 354–355. (“Lying creates
a kind of mental slavery that is an offense against the victim’s humanity”.)
12 Christine Korsgaard interprets Kant in a way that alters the outcome of his
extreme example, the lie to a murderer. Korsgaard argues that this lie, unlike most
lies, survives the test of universal law: it is logically possible to universalize a
principle of lying to known murderers who do not know that their intentions are
known, without defeating the purpose of the lie. Korsgaard, supra note 11, at
pp. 328–330. However, a lie to a murderer does not survive the test of humanity
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A quite different type of argument focuses on the harm lies cause
to society at large. Specifically, lies degrade the background of
trust that supports human interaction. Mill, for example, argued that
lies undermine mutual trust, “the insufficiency of which does more
than any one thing that can be named to keep back civilization,
virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale
depends.”13
Although the problem of social trust is cited by some non-
consequentialists, this line of reasoning seems consequentialist at
heart.14 Perhaps as a result of the argument’s focus on conse-
quences, most who adopt this view do not hold all lies to be wrong.
Yet, even avowed consequentialists are apt to recommend a strong
rule or presumption against lying. Individual reasoners cannot be
counted on to take proper account of the cumulative effect on
trust of lies that appear minor or benign; therefore they should not
lie.15 Thus, for example, Mill suggested that utility is best served
because no person, including a murderer, can knowingly assent to being deceived.
Ibid., at pp. 336–337. Korsgaard resolves this conflict by concluding that in a non-
ideal world, we must adhere to the principle of universal law, but may depart from
the principle of humanity in the face of evil. Ibid., at pp. 446–449.
13 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (New York, 1901; 1st edn., 1869), p. 33. See
Bentham, supra note 5, at p. 260 (falsehood “brings on at last the dissolution of
human society”).
The difference between this form of harm and harm to the addressee of a lie is
nicely expressed by G. J. Warnock: “It is not the implanting of false beliefs that
is damaging, but rather the generation of the suspicion that they may be being
implanted.” G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (1971), pp. 84–85. Warnock
added that the danger is particularly acute because “deception is so easy. . . .
[T]here are, so to speak, no ‘natural signs . . .’ by which the untrustworthy can
be distinguished from the veracious, so that, if any may be deceptive, all may
be. Nor, obviously would it be of any use to devise some special formula for the
purpose of explicitly signaling non-deceptive performance.” Ibid.
14 MacIntyre cites both utilitarians and nonconsequentialists as adherents of
the view that truthfulness is an imperfect duty based on an offense to “trust.”
MacIntyre, supra note 3, at pp. 310–311 (suggesting, however, that this view
raises “consequentialist questions”). Cf. Bok, supra note 4, at pp. 18–20, 52–56
(citing the effect of lying on the addressee’s choices and on society, but eschewing
both consequentialism and other moral “systems”).
15 Bentham also warned that the slightest lie is “a first transgression, which
facilitates a second, and familiarizes the odious idea of a falsehood.” Bentham,
supra note 5, at p. 260.
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by a general prohibition against lies, subject to a few narrow and
well-defined exceptions.16
In contrast to these rather stern assessments of the morality
of lying, at least one moral philosopher has called truth-telling
“morally overrated.”17 David Nyberg points to positive contribu-
tions that lies and other forms of deception can make to civility and
effective moral teaching; to privacy, self-confidence, and emotional
comfort; and even to trust, if trust is understood as the expecta-
tion that another will act in one’s best interests. Dishonesty, in
Nybert’s view, is not only a pervasive feature of human interaction,
but also a basic adaptive skill and at times a means to good ends.18
Accordingly, rather than a prohibition against lying, Nyberg favors
particularistic evaluation of the ethics of deception, guided by prin-
ciples of decency.19 Nyberg is not alone in his ambivalence about
the morality of lying,20 but it is fair to say his tolerant attitude is
contrary to prevailing moral theory.
16 Mill, supra note 13, at pp. 33–34 (“in order that the exception . . . may
have the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be
recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined”). Mill cites, as exceptions, lies that
conceal bad news from a sick person and lies that thwart a wrongdoer. Ibid.
Sissela Bok, although disavowing consequentialism, takes a more particular-
istic approach, defending a strong presumption against lying that exempts only
those lies that can be “publicly justified.” A lie, in Bok’s view, is acceptable only
if all alternatives have been exhausted and the decision to lie can be publicly
justified in the sense that reasonable persons affected by the lie would accept it
as legitimate. Bok, supra note 4, at pp. 30–31, 103–106. Bok’s presumption is
quite strong: even trivial and benign lies should generally avoided because they
breed more and greater lies. Weighing these costs against potential benefits is not
enough because liars will tend to overestimate immediate benefits in comparison
to more remote harm to the foundation of social trust. Ibid., at pp. 57–61, 71–72.
17 Nyberg, supra note 1, at p. 7.
18 Nyberg states that although honesty remains an important value, deception
“may actually serve to promote and preserve emotional equilibrium on a personal
level, and a civilized climate for communicating with each other and living our
lives on a social level.” Ibid., at p. 53.
19 See ibid., at pp. 235–236, 176–191. The problem with deception is not that
we engage in it, but that “we have not trained ourselves to deceive thoughtfully
and judiciously, charitably, humanely, with discretion.” Ibid., at p. 25.
20 See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 3, at p. 41 (suggesting that the morality of
lying depends on the relationship within which the lie is told).
400 LARRY ALEXANDER AND EMILY SHERWIN
B. Lying and Deception
A lie is an assertion contrary to what the speaker believes.21 Decep-
tion is a much broader concept, encompassing an unlimited variety
of devices by which the deceiver creates false impressions in others’
minds.22 It includes actions and omissions, as well as words and
strategic silences.
Moral philosophers frequently distinguish between lying and
deception and condemn lying as the worse offense.23 For example,
the story of Saint Athanasius appears frequently in discussions of
the morality of lying and deception. Saint Athanasius was rowing
downstream when he encountered persecutors hot on his trail.
Not recognizing him, they asked where they might find the Saint.
Athanasius replied “He is not far from here,” and the persecutors
21 As noted previously, some would add that a lie must be intended to deceive.
See, e.g., St. Augustine, Faith, Hope, and Charity, Louis A. Arand (ed. and trans.),
pp. 26–27; Ancient Christian Writers, Johannes Quaten and Joseph Plumpe (eds.)
(1947); Bok, supra note 4, at p. 13, MacIntyre, supra note 3, at p. 316 (associ-
ating this requirement with those who are concerned with the effects of lying on
trust).
22 See, e.g., Michel de Montaigne, “Of Liars”, in Donald M. Frame (trans.),
The Complete Works of Montaigne (1957), p. 24 (“the reverse of truth has a
hundred thousand shapes and a limitless field”); III Henry Sidgwick, The Methods
of Ethics, 7th edn. (1981), p. 317 (referring to “suppressio veri and suggestio
falsi”); Nyberg, supra note 1, at pp. 63–80 (providing examples of deception
through the methods of Ashowing and hiding). Experience tells us that it is also
possible to deceive oneself, even if this appears to be logically impossible. For
interesting discussions of self-deception, see Alan H. Goldman, Practical Rules:
When We Need Them and When We Don’t (2001), pp. 65–71 (discussing theories
of self-deception); Nyberg, supra, at pp. 81–108 (discussing the indispensability
of self-deception).
23 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, “Ethical Duties Toward Others: Truthfulness”, in
Lewis Beck White (ed.), Louis Infield (trans.), Lectures on Ethics (1963), p. 226;
Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan, “The Intent to Deceive”, J. Phil.
74 (1977), pp. 143, 153; Green, supra note 2, at pp. 162–168. See also Sidgwick,
supra note 22, at p. 317 (discussing the view that lying is worse than deception). A
notable exception is Aquinas, who wrote that “it does not matter whether someone
lie by word or by some sort of deed, and since every lie is sinful, . . . so also is
every act of deception.” Aquinas, supra note 7, at p. 171.
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hurried on.24 The point of the story is not that the Saint deceived,
but that he ingeniously avoided the need to lie.
At times, the moral distinction between lying and other forms of
deception has been taken to great lengths, as in the Jesuitic doctrine
of mental reservation: an otherwise false statement does not count,
morally, as a lie if the speaker privately understands the statement
in a way that is technically true. (I say, “I didn’t do it,” thinking
“today.” In this way I preserve – maybe – a correspondence between
my words and my thoughts.)25 Others have suggested distinctions
not only between lying and deception, but among methods of decep-
tion. Deceptive acts may be worse than deceptive omissions. Direct
deception may be worse than deception by indirection. Deception
that creates false beliefs may be worse than deception that negates
or blocks true beliefs.26
Not surprisingly, the sharpest distinctions between lying and
other forms of deception are drawn by deontological theorists, who
focus on the nature of false assertions. Kant, for example, saw no
wrong in the act of packing bags in the presence of others to create
the impression that one is about to leave town.27 Those who observe
this conduct may form false beliefs, but they “have no right to expect
that my action will express my real mind.”28 Presumably, in the
absence of an assertion, the deceiver is not being false to himself.29
Nor does the deceiver violate a duty to others, because those who are
deceived bear moral responsibility for the inferences they draw.30
24 Versions of this story can be found in, among other sources, James Rachels,
The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 2nd edn. (1993), pp. 165–166 and MacIntyre,
supra note 3, at p. 336.
25 Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains (1996), p. 29 (quoting Pascal).
26 See Chisholm and Feehan, supra note 23, at p. 145 (identifying eight
categories of deception, which differ in degree of wrongfulness). Chisholm and
Rogers also suggest moral distinctions that depend on the intended ends of
deception. See ibid., at pp. 146–148.
27 Kant, “Ethical Duties Toward Others: Truthfulness”, supra note 23, at p. 226.
28 Ibid.
29 Kant offered his bag-packing example in a lecture on duties to others;
however, it seems fair to assume that he would extend the same reasoning to his
later-developed notion of lying as an offense to the liar’s own humanity.
30 See Green, supra note 2, at pp. 166–167. According to Green, a lie implies
a personal “warranty of truth” by the liar. Thus, the lie both creates and breaches
a “relationship of trust between a speaker and listener.” Ibid., at p. 166. In a case
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Others have expressed this reasoning more formally. An asser-
tion implies a complex set of intentions on the part of the speaker.
Specifically, the speaker who asserts a proposition intends the
listener to believe (1) that the speaker believes the proposition to
be true and (2) that the speaker intends the listener to believe that
the speaker believes the proposition to be true.31 As a result, the
assertion has normative force: the listener is justified in believing
what the speaker has said.32 In the absence of an assertion, there is
no basis for attributing these intentions to the speaker; therefore, the
listener has no right to expect truth, and the wrong is not so grave.33
Thus, by this account, if a friend is searching for you in
Nordstrom’s and calls you on your cell phone, and you tell her
falsely that you are not in the store, you have made a lying asser-
tion and can be morally condemned for doing so. If, however, you
merely position yourself behind one of the store’s pillars to create
the false impression that you are not there, you have merely deceived
by conduct. If you have committed a wrong a all, it is not as serious
as the lie.
Although our present task is descriptive, we note that we are not
persuaded by these arguments, which demand too much from the
notion of a false assertion. The first difficulty lies in defining an
assertion. Members of a community learn to derive meaning not
only from each other’s statements, or even from assertive conduct,
but also from various indirect or wordless ways of conveying
information.34 At the same time, all communication, including
verbal assertions, depends on inferences about meaning. Thus, both
the person deceived by a suggestion or evasion and the person
deceived by a lie participate in the in the deception by properly
applying generally understood rules of inference. Neither form of
of non-lying deception, the speaker makes no warranty; meanwhile the victim
contributes to his own false belief by drawing an inference and failing to query.
31 Chisholm and Feehan, supra note 23, at p. 151.
32 Ibid., at pp. 151–152.
33 Ibid., at p. 153.
34 In a marketing study, for example, an image of a kitten next to a box of facial
tissue proved to be more effective than words in conveying a message that the
tissue was soft. See Mitchel and Olson, “Are Product Attribute Beliefs the Only
Mediator of Advertising Effects on Brand Attitude?”, J. Marketing Research 18
(1981), p. 318.
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participation seems deserving of sufficient moral weight to shift
responsibility from the deceiver to the deceived.35
Another difficulty lies in distinguishing false assertions from true
but misleading assertions. Without going so far as mental reserva-
tion, it is possible to say truthfully that there is no cat in your
house when there are three felines but no aging jazz musicians. And
it is literally true that Bill Clinton was never alone in the White
House with Monica Lewinski if alone means that they were the
only people in the building of that name. Although these are not
literally lies, they seem equally contrary to nature, humanity, and
language. Whether the wrong of lying is seen as offense to nature or
humanity or as offense to the autonomy of those deceived, we see
no substantial difference between misleading assertions of this kind
and assertions that are literally false.
Turning to the effects of deception on trust within a society, argu-
ments based on trust do not depend logically on the existence of
an assertion. Presumably any conduct that conveys meaning under-
mines trust between members of society when used deliberately to
instill false beliefs. Yet, those who invoke harm to trust as the prin-
cipal evil of lying also tend to focus their attention on lies strictly
35 Jonathan Adler has suggested a distinction between “communicative”
and“non-communicative” deception. Communicative deception is akin to lying
in that the speaker invites the listener to accept conversational “implicatures”
that situate the speaker’s remark within the norms of conversation. For example,
Adler maintains that in Kant’s example of packing bags, the deception is non-
communicative and therefore does not invite the other to draw a conclusion. But
telling a murderer that his intended victim “has been hanging around the Nevada
a lot” invites the murderer to accept an implicature that the victim is now at the
Nevada. Jonathan Adler, “Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating”, J. Phil. 44
(1997), pp. 434, 444–445.
Adler goes on to argue that, although lying and communicative deception are
indistinguishable in terms of intent, consequences, and responsibility, there is
nevertheless reason to draw a moral distinction. Specifically, the choice of decep-
tion over lying indicates the speaker’s effort to avoid either a hurtful truth or a lie,
and to deflect rather than deny the moral demand for truth. According to Adler,
even if there is no moral distinction between lying and deception in a particular
case, there are morally important reasons to maintain a norm that treats deception
as the lesser evil. A norm of this kind will serve as a “safety valve” that protects
the basic norm of truthfulness in situations in which truth is destructive. At the
same time, Adler cautions against abuse of this device. Ibid., at pp. 448–452.
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defined. Mill, for example, emphasized the effect of lies on “the
trustworthiness of human assertion.”36
Perhaps this position can be explained on the ground that the
trustworthiness of assertions has special social importance. If we
cannot eliminate all deception from human interaction, we should at
least try to preserve core conventions of dialogue. One such conven-
tion is that positive assertions of fact are true in the ordinary sense of
the words used.37 If this convention is generally respected, speakers
can signal their seriousness by choosing to make assertions, and
listeners will have a safe haven of confidence. Yet, again, the argu-
ment is weak because it relies on a distinction between direct from




Law prohibits deception in very broad terms.38 The modern tort of
deceit (or fraudulent misrepresentation) cuts through the distinc-
tions drawn by philosophers, encompassing words and conduct,39
36 Mill, supra note 13, at p. 33. See Bentham, supra note 5, at p. 260
(addressing “falsehood”); Bok, supra note 4, at p. 13 (limiting her analysis to
lies, defined as intentionally false statements).
37 See Sidgwick, supra note 22, at p. 317 (citing the common view that “it is
only an absolute duty to make our actual affirmations true: for it is said that though
the ideal condition of human converse involves perfect sincerity and candor, and
we ought to rejoice in exhibiting these virtues where we can, still in our actual
world concealment is frequently necessary to the well-being of society, and may
be legitimately effected by any means short of actual falsehood”).
38 On deception in tort and contract law, see generally 2 Dan B. Dobbs,
Dobbs Law of Remedies, 2nd edn. (1993), pp. 541–603 [hereinafter Dobbs,
Remedies] (remedies for misrepresentation); 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth
on Contracts, 2nd edn. (1998), pp. 472–477 [hereinafter Farnsworth] (contract
doctrine); W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton and David G. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th edn. (1984), pp. 725–735 [hereinafter
Prosser and Keeton] (tort doctrine). On deception in criminal law, see generally
Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law, 3rd edn. (2000), pp. 828–850; Green, supra
note 2, at pp. 182–201.
39 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §525 and comment b (1977); Prosser and
Keeton, supra note 38, at pp. 736–740.
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active deception and passive non-disclosure,40 false suggestions and
concealment of truth.41 It covers deception about facts, opinions,
or law,42 and treats evasive half-truths and intentional ambiguities
as equivalent to false statements.43 Similarly comprehensive rules
govern deception as a defense to contractual obligation.44
Deception is also a crime. This was not always the case: Early
English law punished only specific categories of deception, such as
forgery and use of false weights and measures, that threatened the
public at large or were not avoidable through caution. Simply lying
to obtain property was not a crime until the middle of the eighteenth
century.45 In modern law, however, criminal liability is nearly as
broad as civil liability. The Model Penal Code, for example, imposes
liability on one who, in order to obtain another’s property, “creates
40 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §551 (1977); cf. Prosser and Keeton,
supra note 38, at pp. 737–738 (citing a general rule against recovery for non-
disclosure, subject to numerous exceptions). Liability of non-disclosure remains
limited, suggesting that the active/passive distinction may carry some weight in
law. See infra.
41 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §550 (1977); Prosser and Keeton, supra
note 38, at pp. 736–737 (“Misrepresentation may be found in statements which
are literally true, but which create a false impression in the mind of the hearer”).
42 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §525 (1977).
43 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§527, 529 (1977); Prosser and Keeton,
supra note 38, at p. 738 (“half of the truth may obviously amount to a lie, if it is
understood to be the whole”).
The original common law cause of action for deceit was quite limited, applying
principally to deception in the course of judicial proceedings. But falsehood
played a significant role in actions of trespass on the case, and breach of promise
first entered English law as a form of deception. See J. H. Baker, An Introduction
to English Legal History, 3rd edn. (1990), pp. 376–384.
44 See generally Farnsworth, supra note 38, at pp. 402–430.
45 See Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its
Processes, 7th edn. (2001), pp. 951–953; Lafave, supra note 38, at pp. 828–829;
Green, supra note 2, at pp. 182–187. Crimes of deception were gradually enlarged
under the headings of embezzlement, false pretenses (defined as acquiring title to
property through misrepresentation of existing facts), and larceny by trick. See
Green, supra. Failure to criminalize fraud may originally have resulted from the
requirement that trespass be vis et armis (by force and arms). See Baker, supra
note 43, at pp. 606–608 (discussing the evolution of larceny). By the eighteenth
century, however, it also reflected ideas about responsibility. See Regina v. Jones,
91 Eng. Rep. 330, 330 (1703) (Holt, C. J.) (“we are not to indict one for making
a fool of another”).
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or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to
law, value, intention, or state of mind; . . . [or] prevents another
from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a
transaction . . .”.46
B. Loopholes
On closer study, legal regulation of deception is not as pervasive
as it first seems. There are important exemptions and qualifications
in laws governing deception. These loopholes, together with an
evident failure to enforce the stated law according to its terms and an
interesting willingness to tolerate deception in the operation of the
legal system itself, raise questions about the relationship between
law and morality. We proceed first to identify some of the ways in
which law tolerates deception; later we consider possible explana-
tions and suggest tentative conclusions about deception in law and
morality.
1. Exemptions
In certain contexts, the typically broad legal prohibition of deception
does not apply. For example, liability for fraud is quite limited in
the area of sexual relations. In criminal cases, deception does not
invalidate consent to sex unless it amounts to “fraud in the factum.”
Thus, if a woman consents to sex with a man impersonating her
husband, he has raped her; but if she consents to sex with a man who
falsely swears that he loves her, her consent is effective to protect
him from punishment.47 Tort liability is also limited: the few cases
allowing recovery for fraudulent inducement of sex involve particu-
46 Model Penal Code §223.3. Section 223.3 also covers non-disclosure, but
limits liability to non-disclosure to failure “to correct a false impression which
the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to
be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary relationship.” This is
slightly narrower than the standard for rescission of contracts on the ground of
non-disclosure. See infra.
47 See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, §33.05[c] (1995). This is
not because lying is rare in sexual situations. In a survey of college students, 34%
of males admitted to lying to obtain sex. 42% of females indicated willingness
to lie about the number of their prior sexual partners. See Susan D. Cochran and
Vickie M. Mays, “Sex, Lies, and HIV”, N. E. J. Med. 322 (1990), pp. 774, 774–
775.
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larly egregious lies, such as lies about venereal disease or infertility
that result in serious physical consequences, or lies by fiduciaries.48
Another context in which the law shifts to a narrow definition of
deception is perjury. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the crime
of perjury requires a false statement of fact. Half-truths, evasive
answers, and answers that are literally true but misleading are not
punishable.49
There may be reasons to isolate these situations for special treat-
ment. The problem of consent to sex raises difficult questions about
equity between sexes and about the feasibility and consequences
of legal intervention.50 A strict rule for perjury, confining liability
to false assertions, may be justified by the formal opportunities for
48 See Jane E. “Larsen, Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good
Nature Deceit: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction”, Colum. L. Rev. 93 (1993),
pp. 374, 401–412 (collecting cases); Paula C. Murray and Brenda J. Winslett,
“The Constitutional Right to Privacy and Emerging Tort Liability for Deceit in
Interpersonal Relations”, U. Ill. L. Rev. 1986 (1986), p. 779 (discussing cases
involving venereal disease and unwanted pregnancy). Larsen proposes recogni-
tion of a tort of sexual fraud, defined as intentional misrepresentation to gain
consent to sex. Ibid., at pp. 379–380. For a case emphatically denying relief for a
husband’s claim that his wife falsely represented her sexual desire for him prior to
their marriage, see Askew v. Askew, 22 Cal. App. 4th 942, 958 (1994) (referring to
“the sheer unseemliness of litigating tender matters of romantic or sexual emotion
in courts of law”).
On the question of consent to sex, see generally “Symposium on Consent to
Sexual Relations”, Legal Theory 2 (1996), p. 87.
49 See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), in which a witness in a
bankruptcy proceeding was asked whether he had ever maintained a Swiss bank
account. He replied that his company maintained a Swiss account for six months,
thereby eliding the fact that he himself had also maintained Swiss accounts. Ibid.,
at p. 354. The Court held that the witness had not committed perjury.
For an interesting, and entertaining, discussion of perjury and the Clinton
impeachment, see Green, supra note 2, at pp. 202–211.
50 Larsen reports that abolition of the tort of seduction, which flourished in
various forms from the seventeenth century until the early twentieth century, was
due in part to feminist opposition to the ideal of female sexual constraint. See
Larsen, supra note 48, at p. 390.
For a suggestion that legal treatment of deception in sex is morally problematic
but perhaps justified by the difficulties of legal intervention, see Emily Sherwin,
“Infelicitous Sex”, Legal Theory 2 (1996), pp. 209, 227–228.
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cross-examination that are available in legal proceedings.51 Yet the
existence of context-based exceptions establishes that, in law, other
considerations may sometimes override the norm of truthfulness.
2. Qualifications
In addition to legal toleration of deception in particular contexts, the
seemingly broad definitions of fraud that govern tort and contract
law are subject to subtle but important qualifications. One such
qualification, running throughout the legal treatment of deception,
is that deception must cause concrete, usually economic, harm. For
example, the crime of theft by deception is defined by the Model
Penal Code as deception for the purpose of acquiring property, and
excludes matters of “no pecuniary significance.”52
Similarly, the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation normally
requires proof of economic loss.53 Deceit is not among the so-called
“dignitary” torts – torts such as assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, and defamation, for which plaintiffs may recover substantial
damages without proof of economic injury.54 Nominal damages are
not available for deceit, and punitive damages are awarded spar-
ingly.55 Courts have recognized claims for physical injuries, and
occasionally for intangible injuries, but the damages awarded have
been for identifiable effects of the misrepresentation rather than the
51 Stuart Green argues that perjury rules correspond to the moral distinction
between lying and non-lying deception based on the responsibility of the listener.
Green, supra note 2, at p. 177. Perjury rules may also reflect a general sentiment
of moral leniency toward individuals facing the machinery of the state. Cf. ibid.,
at pp. 198–201 (discussing exculpatory lies).
52 Model Penal Code §223.3.
53 Restatement (Second) of Torts §525 (1977) (requiring “pecuniary loss”);
Dobbs, supra note 38, at p. 548 (“Misrepresentation is an economic tort; actual
financial damages are usually required”); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at
p. 765 (“the plaintiff must have suffered substantial damages before the cause
of action can arise”). Although Prosser and Keeton attribute this to the origins
of deceit in the action of trespass on the case, the requirement still applies, with
occasional exceptions, in modern law.
54 For a general description of dignitary torts, see Dobbs, supra note 38, at
p. 304.
55 See ibid., at p. 548 (nominal damages are not recoverable for fraud that
causes no harm), p. 568 (favoring punitive damages in cases of harmful and
intentional fraud).
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affront of having been deceived.56 Deception also plays a part in
other torts, such as defamation, but in these cases the legal wrong
lies in the use of deception to pursue ends that are independently
tortious, such as harm to reputation.57 Thus, in regard to the scope
of compensable injury, tort law does not go as far to penalize fraud
as it does to penalize force.
When the remedy sought is rescission of a transaction rather
than damages, courts differ about what sort of harm will suffice.
Although many say that pecuniary harm is required, some courts
apply the requirement loosely, and others have done away with it.58
Of course, a claim for rescission based on deception implies that
the person deceived was induced to part with value.59 Thus, even
when rescission is allowed without proof of economic loss, it does
not follow that courts are providing a remedy for the indignity of
deception.
56 Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at p. 726. For an example of a physical
injury case, see Flaherty v. Till, 137 N.S. 815 (1912), in which the defendant
diagnosed the plaintiff with “rheumatism of the stomach,” and advised him to
cover his body in a poultice of “olive, amber, and kerosine oils.”
One aberrant case is Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37 (La. 1920). In Nickerson,
a woman set about digging for a pot of gold, convinced that her ancestors had
buried such an item. The defendants, after watching her dig for several months,
buried a pot of dirt and rocks, with a note attached advising the finder to wait
three days before opening the pot. The victim found the pot and took it to a bank
for safekeeping. The hoax was exposed when the pot was later opened before a
group of onlookers. The court awarded $500 for “mental suffering and humili-
ation, . . . to say nothing of the disappointment and conviction, which she carried
to her grave, . . . that she had been robbed.” Ibid., at p. 39. This case comes close
to giving legal redress for conveyance of a false belief. Yet, even here, the key
element of harm may have been public humiliation rather than deception itself.
57 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 22, Scope Note (1977); Prosser and
Keeton, supra note 38, at pp. 725–726.
58 See Dobbs, supra note 38, at p. 582 (recommending against a firm rule
denying rescission in the absence of damage); Farnsworth, supra note 38, at
p. 462 (maintaining that damage is “not an inevitable requirement for rescission”);
Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at p. 766 (courts state that damage is required,
but often make exceptions).
59 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §165 (1981) (misrepresentation must
“substantially contribute” to the decision to transact); Farnworth, supra note 38, at
p. 462 (“in most cases there is no difficulty in finding detriment – the recipient has
obtained the thing expected, but has found that it is worth less than the recipient
was led to expect”).
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A case that comes close to giving relief for deception pure and
simple is Earl v. Saks & Co., in which a man purchased a fur coat for
$4000 as a gift for a female friend. The actual price was $5000, but
the friend had secretly agreed with the store that she would pay the
extra $1000. When the buyer discovered that he had been deceived,
he sought to return the coat and recover his money. A majority of the
court allowed him to do so, saying that on these facts, “the general
social interest in stability of transactions is overridden by the interest
in not having a seller make intentional misrepresentations which
mislead a would-be donor into the erroneous belief that he alone
is purchasing and that his donee is to receive from him a fully paid
for gift.”60 There are not many cases of this kind, however, and even
here it might be said that the indignity had economic consequences,
when the infuriated buyer was left with a coat that he had no use for
and could not easily sell.61
A second qualification, which appears in tort and contract law
governing fraud in transactions, is the requirement of justified reli-
ance. Not only must the victim of a misrepresentation rely in fact,
but reliance must also be justified according to external standards of
reasonableness drawn in large part from custom. The reason most
often given for this requirement is a general interest in security of
60 226 P.2d 340, 346 (Cal. 1951). Justice Traynor dissented, saying that the
fraud was immaterial: at the time of the purchase, the buyer would probably have
accepted the deal.
61 Edmond Cahn’s report of the case suggests that the couple split up the night
of the purchase. Edmond Cahn, The Moral Decision, (1955), p. 130. Whether
they fell out over the coat or for other reasons is not clear. Cahn believes the
majority was correct in giving legal relief based on the effect of deception on the
buyer’s “non-economic motives:” “B- - - - - may have had in him something of the
medieval troubadour, or at least of the poetic dreamer who serves and worships at
Aphrodite’s altar. Where another man might fling up to his beloved on her balcony
a rose or a song or a poem, B- - - - - would fling her a mink coat.” Ibid., at p. 131.
Alternatively, B- - - - - may have derived pleasure from securing a bargain. Either
way, the false belief itself, in Cahn’s view, warranted legal relief. See ibid., at
p. 132.
Another case sometimes cited with Earl v. Saks is Brett v. Cooney, 53 A. 729
(Conn. 1902), in which buyers of land disguised their identity and their plan to
run a boarding house. The price was fair, but sale for the purpose of a boarding
house violated an “honorary obligation” of the seller to his neighbors. In this case,
the harm appears to lie in reputational consequences rather than in the deception
itself.
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transactions, which counterbalances the wrong of misrepresentation
and the interest in fully informed consent.62
The requirement of justified reliance allows the factfinder to
reach a normative judgment about what the victim, given his circum-
stances, should have believed and acted on. It differs from a contrib-
utory negligence standard in that the victim’s special vulnerability
is taken into account. Nevertheless, the effect of the requirement is
to place a degree of responsibility on the victim for his own false
belief, even in the case of an outright lie.
Without fully defining the requirement of justified reliance, the
tort and contract Restatements describe several situations in which
the victim of a misrepresentation is not entitled to relief. The victim
ordinarily cannot rely on an adverse party’s statement of opinion
as an assertion that content of the opinion is correct.63 This limita-
tion gains importance because statements about the value, quality,
or authenticity of an item for sale are deemed to be statements of
opinion, even if they take the form of factual assertions.64 Thus, if
a seller asserts that the goods he is offering are “worth $10,000,”
62 See Farnsworth, supra note 38, at p. 400 (citing general concern for stability
of transactions); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at p. 753 (discussing materi-
ality). Prosser and Keeton also imply that the requirement of justifiable reliance
is best understood as testing the credibility of the claim that fraud induced the
plaintiff to act. Prosser and Keeton, supra, at p. 753. This view, however, makes
justifiable reliance redundant of causation.
63 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §542 (1977). This is echoed in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §169 (1981). In each case, opposite conclu-
sion applies under certain conditions, such as a confidential relationship, a claim
of expertise, or special vulnerability on the part of the victim. Restatement
(Second) of Torts, supra, §542(a)–(d); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra,
§169(a)–(c). Further, the victim may, depending on the circumstances, be entitled
to infer from a statement of opinion that the speaker had some support for the
opinion and was not aware of contrary facts. Restatement (Second) of Torts,
supra, §539; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, §168(2).
Statements of law may be treated either as statements of fact (justifying reli-
ance) or as statements of opinion (ordinarily not justifying reliance), depending on
the circumstances. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §545 (1977); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §170 (1981).
64 Restatement (Second) of Torts §538A(b) (1977); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §168, comment c (1981).
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having purchased them for $8000, the statement will be treated as
an opinion, on which the victim cannot justifiably rely.65
Statements of intention are also to be viewed with suspicion. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states that reliance on a statement of
intention is justified only if “the recipient has reason to believe that it
will be carried out.”66 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts goes
further, providing that “the recipient is not justified in relying . . . if
in the circumstances a misrepresentation of intention is consistent
with reasonable standards of dealing.”67 This rule is illustrated by
the example of a buyer of land who lies about his intended use of
the land in order to conceal his special need for the seller’s property.
According to the Restatement, the seller is not entitled to rely, and
may not later claim rescission.68
Another aspect of the requirement of justified reliance is that
a victim of misrepresentation may not ignore evident facts to the
contrary. The victim is not held to a standard of reasonable care
in investigating the truth or falsity of statements made in negoti-
65 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §168, illus. 2 (1981); see Farnsworth,
supra note 38, at p. 464 (remarking that a seller’s statements about quality or value
are more likely to be understood as statements of opinion than statements about
quantity or market price); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at p. 757 (“sales talk,
or puffing, . . . is onsidered to be offerend and understood as an expression of the
seller’s opinion only, which is to be discounted as such by the buyer”). At best, the
victim would be justified in drawing an inference about background facts known
to the seller, but only if the inference were “reasonable.” Several references in the
Restatements to sellers’ well-known habits of “puffing” and exaggerating value
suggest that in this case, an inference of supporting facts would be unreasonable.
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §168, supra, comment d (referring to the
“propensity of sellers and buyers to exaggerate the advantages to the other party
of they bargains they promise”); Restatement (Second) of Torts §539, comment c
(1977) (referring to the “habit of vendors to exaggerate”).
66 Restatement (Second) of Torts §544 (1977) (adding in comment a that reli-
ance is justified “only when the representation gives its recipient reason to believe
that the intention is firmly entertained”).
67 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §171(1) (1981); see Farnsworth, supra
note 38, at p. 471 (“courts have accorded the maker considerable latitude in
misrepresenting intention if the statement if of the kind that is generally regarded
as unreliable”).
68 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §171, comment a, Illus. 2 (1981).
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ations.69 He is, however, responsible for laxity that amounts to
“a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing.”70
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adds, as a further element of
justified reliance, a requirement of materiality.71 A misrepresenta-
tion is material if “a reasonable man would attach importance” to
it, or alternatively, if the speaker knew or had reason to know it
had special significance for the victim.72 If the misrepresentation
is not material, the victim has no tort claim. This rule introduces a
de minimus limit: some misrepresentations, even if believable and in
fact believed and acted on, are too minor to have legal consequences.
69 Restatement (Second) of Torts §540 (1977); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §172, comment b (1981); see Farnsworth, supra note 38, at p. 465
(noting that failure to investigate is often excused); Prosser and Keeton, supra
note 38, at p. 752 (indicating that claimants may rely without investigation).
70 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §172 (1981). Restatement (Second) of
Torts §541 provides, to similar effect, that the victim is not justified in relying in
the face of “obvious” falsity. Both Restatements explain that the victim must “use
his senses” and not rely “blindly.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §541, comment
a (1977); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, §172, comment b.
71 The materiality requirement is omitted from the rules for rescission of
contracts stated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, although it may be
recognized by courts. Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), §164 (author-
izing rescission for “either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation”) and
comment b (noting the difference between tort and contract rules). See 1 Farns-
worth, supra note 38, at p. 459 (observing that cases granting rescission for
non-material fraud are “difficult to find.”)
Despite the explicit omission of the materiality requirement, comments to the
Restatement state that reliance on a misrepresentation of facts that are “of only
peripheral importance to the transaction” is not justified. Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §164, supra, comment d. Further, reliance in fact is presumed if the
misrepresentation is material, but must be established if it is not. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, supra, §167 comment b.
For a discussion of the role of materiality in tort and contract rules, see
Emily Sherwin, “Nonmaterial Misrepresentations: Damages, Rescission, and the
Possibility of Efficient Fraud”, Loyola L. Rev. 36 (2003), p. 1017.
72 Restatement (Second) of Torts §538(2) (1977). Prosser and Keeton explain
the relationship between justifiable reliance and materiality by saying that, while
other elements of justifiable reliance are concerned with representations that
should not be believed (such as a seller’s “puffing” or an adverse party’s statement
of opinion), materiality is concerned with representations that should not be acted
on. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at p. 753.
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It is worth noting that the various legal guidelines for determining
whether reliance is justified rely heavily on custom. The implica-
tions of a statement of opinion must be judged “in light of the
realities of the marketplace,” taking into account “the propensity of
sellers and buyers to exaggerate the advantages . . . of the bargains
they promise.”73 A statement of intention should not be taken as true
if “reasonable standards of dealing” permit deception.74 Similarly,
parties are expected to “act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing” in assessing the statements of
others.75 Thus, in significant ways, the rules follow rather than shape
the evolution of trade practices.
Another limitation on the seemingly broad legal prohibition
of deception is a substantial immunity for deception in the form
of non-disclosure. Passive deception is not always permissible.
Special facts may generate a duty to disclose, as when one party
to a transaction learns something that makes a prior statement
misleading.76 Custom also may impose a duty to disclose. For
example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires disclosure
when one party to a transaction knows the other is making a mistake
about “basic” facts, and the mistaken party, “because of the rela-
tionship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure.”77 Disclosure
73 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §168, comment d. To the same effect, see
Restatement (Second) of Torts §539, comment c; see Farnsworth, supra note 38,
at p. 471 (referring to general understandings); Prosser and Keeton, supra note
38, at p. 757 (same).
74 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §171(2) (1981).
75 Ibid., §172.
76 Restatement (Second) of Torts §551(2)(c) (1977); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §161(a) (1981); see Farnsworth, supra note 38, at p. 453 (discussing
subsequently discovery of falsehood); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at
p. 738 (same). Disclosure is also required to clarify a statement that would other-
wise be misleading, to correct a prior misrepresentation before it is acted on, or
within a fiduciary relationship. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, §551(2);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, §161.
77 Restatement (Second) of Torts §551(2)(e) (1977). The Restatement of
Contracts provides similarly that disclosure is required when one party knows
the other is mistaken “as to a basic assumption on which the party is making
the contract,” and nondisclosure “amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.” Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §161(d) (1981).
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requirements of this kind have become stricter over time, especially
in settings in which parties tend to differ in their sophistication.78
Yet, in a transaction between similarly situated parties, a party with
pertinent information generally may withhold the information and
take advantage of the other party’s ignorance. As stated in comments
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[t]o a considerable extent,
sanctioned by the customs and mores of the community, superior
information and better business acumen are legitimate advantages,
which lead to no liability.”79
3. In Contrast: Fiduciary Duties
The significance of the various limitations on liability for misrepre-
sentation under basic rules of tort and contract law is indicated by
the stricter rules applied to fiduciaries.80 Fiduciary rules apply to
those acting in certain recognized fiduciary rules, such as lawyers,
doctors, brokers, and trustees, and to those occupying roles that
appear, on case-by-case analysis, to invite confidence. Statements
that otherwise would be treated as unreliable statements of opinion
become assertions that justify reliance when spoken by fiduciaries.81
78 See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at p. 739 (noting “a rather amorphous
tendency . . . to find a duty of disclosure when the circumstances are such that
the failure to disclose something would violate a standard requiring conformity
to what the ordinary ethical person would have disclosed”); G. Richard Shell,
“Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases:
An Emerging Statutory Trend”, Nw. U. L. Rev. 82 (1988), pp. 1198, 1232–1234
(discussing and endorsing enlarged disclosure requirements under state consumer
protection and deceptive trade practice statutes).
79 Restatement (Second) of Torts §551, comment k (1977).
80 On fiduciary relationships, see, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, “A Cognitive
Theory of Fiduciary Relationships”, Cornell L. Rev. 85 (2000), p. 767 (suggesting
that courts rely on cognitive schemas in judging the behavior of fiduciaries);
Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Freedman, “The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences”, N. Y. U. L. Rev. 66 (1991), p. 1045
(outlining an agency approach); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fishel,
“Contract and Fiduciary Duty”, J. L. & Econ. 36 (1993), p. 425 (arguing that fidu-
ciary relationships are derivable from contract); Tamar Frankel, “Fiduciary Law”,
Cal. L. Rev. 71 (1983), p. 795 (providing an overview); Deborah A. DeMott,
“Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligations”, Duke L. Rev. 1988
(1988), p. 879 (emphasizing the fact-specific nature of fiduciary duties).
81 Restatement (Second) of Torts §542 (1977); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §169 (1981); see Farnsworth, supra note 38, at p. 468 (discussing
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A fiduciary’s failure to disclose information is equivalent to
misrepresentation, although a non-fiduciary would be permitted
to exploit similar informational advantages. Fiduciary disclosure
requirements extend not only to material information, but to “all
relevant facts.”82
These special rules close most legal loopholes pertaining to
deception when the parties’ relationship is deemed to require a
greater than ordinary degree of trust. By raising standards in a
limited class of cases, they imply that in the ordinary run of legal
relations, trust is not absolutely prized. Fiduciary rules also suggest
that when trust is given high priority, the mechanisms for stricter
legal regulation of deception are in place. In recent years there has
been a proliferation of regulations imposing fiduciary obligations in
various sensitive settings, such as sales of securities to the public.
Yet, although the field of fiduciary relations has expanded, the
gap between fiduciary and non-fiduciary requirements persists and
continues to highlight the limitations of ordinary rules governing
deception.
4. Law and Practice
Another, rather obvious point about legal rules governing deception
is that they are under-enforced. Consider, for example, a job inter-
view. As a candidate, the first thing you do is select from your closet
your best suit, a much nicer set of clothes than you typically wear to
work. Throughout the day, you are bright and cheerful to everyone
you meet, despite a headache and contrary to several personality
traits you know it is best to suppress. You sit and speak in ways you
think will suggest confidence and ease, neither of which you feel.
You express your interest in Lincoln, Nebraska, and your curiosity
about municipal bond financing. Each of these acts is designed to
mislead, in a transaction that has real stakes for everyone, and is not
an act of benevolence on your part.
On a plausible reading of the Model Penal Code, the candidate
has committed a series of crimes. An employee’s businesslike
special duties of fiduciaries in regard to statements of opinion); Prosser and
Keeton, supra note 38, at p. 738 (same).
82 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §173 (1981); Farnsworth, supra note 38,
at p. 550 (discussing disclosure duties of fiduciaries); Prosser and Keeton, supra
note 38, at p. 452 (same).
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appearance, collegiality, commitment to the employer’s locale, and
level of interest in the work are matters of “pecuniary significance”
to the employer, and on each of these points the candidate has
deliberately conveyed a false impression.83 The elements of tort
liability, if interpreted literally, are also in place.
Yet, the job candidate would surely be surprised if accused of a
crime or a tort. On the criminal side, prosecutorial discretion and
other procedures for selective enforcement would screen out a case
of this kind. On the civil side, a common sense interpretation of
doctrinal requirements such as materiality and justified reliance,
informed by customs that are well understood even if difficult to
articulate, would have a similar effect.
In practice, therefore, express omissions and qualifications of
liability are supplemented by unwritten limits on liability for decep-
tion. At the same time, there is no great uncertainty about the actual
reach of the law. We seem to have a working understanding of what
is truly prohibited and what is not.
C. Deception Within the Legal System
In addition to tolerating a good deal of deception by private actors,
our legal system itself engages in various types of deception.
Much of what lawyers do in representing clients can be viewed
as deceptive. Judges traditionally have endorsed legal fictions as
means of adjusting rules of law to new circumstances. The body
of law at times seems designed to mislead ordinary citizens about
the content of legal duties and the consequences that follow from
their breach. Finally, there is a sense in which any determinate legal
rule of conduct deceives its audience about what action they should
take.
1. Lawyers
The place of honesty within the professional obligations of lawyers
has been debated without resolution for many centuries.84 Truth and
candor are naturally in conflict with strong advocacy, persuasion of
83 See Model Penal Cole §223.3; text at note 46, supra.
84 For an interesting review of positions taken by jurists and philosophers,
focusing on the case of Regina v. Courvoisier, 173 Eng. Rep. 869 (1840), see
David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer (1973), pp. 220–269.
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legal decision-makers, effective negotiation, and protection of client
confidences.85 To argue effectively for a client’s legal positions, a
lawyer must present law and facts favorably. Outright fabrication or
falsification is prohibited by ethical rules, and most lawyers respect
those rules.86 But favorable presentation often means offering one
interpretation when the lawyer, on objective reflection, actually
finds another more convincing.87 Especially when arguing to a
jury, the lawyer must present his interpretation with confidence and
enthusiasm, and must offer it as part of a coherent and appealing
“story” of the case.88 Even when arguing law to a court, the lawyer,
although he may not misrepresent the facts or holdings of cases or
the wording of statutes, will frequently make claims about policy
and morality that he does not accept because, at bottom, he believes
that the premises underlying them are false or the reasoning from
them is fallacious. The lawyer does these things in the role of
advocate, but maximally effective advocacy also requires the lawyer
to disguise to some extent his adversary posture.89
In addition to advocacy, a lawyer serves as professional negoti-
ator in settlements and other transactions. Here the temptation
85 See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (1986), p. 639 (objectives of
“truth, zeal, and confidentiality . . . can pull in different directions”).
86 Richard Underwood, a former Chairman of the Kentucky Bar Association’s
Ethics Committee, suggests that lawyers are mixed at best in their compliance
with various requirements of truthfulness. Underwood also suggests that, although
people want lawyers to be honest in the abstract, “they do not shop for ethical
lawyers.” Richard H. Underwood, “The Professional and the Liar”, Ky. L. J. 87
(1998–1999), pp. 919, 937–937, n. 57.
87 See ibid., at p. 643 (“It is certainly not a standard requirement that an
American advocate must always avoid distorting facts.”).
88 See, e.g., Michael E Tigar, Persuasion: The Litigator’s Art, pp. 6–8 (empha-
sizing the important of telling a story: “The jurors will find one. The advocate had
better tell one.”). Tigar recommends that lawyers “map out a closing argument in
the very first stages of working on a case,” in order to fit subsequent investigations
and reflections into a coherent story. Ibid., at p. 15. “In working the case, you say
its story over and over.” Ibid., at p. 16.
89 Tigar advises that “Your credibility is a necessary, though not sufficient,
condition for victory. You first exercise this principle in opening statement, telling
the jurors there are hard choices to make in this case.” Ibid., at p. 151.
For a unsparing account of this and other forms of dissembling by lawyers, see
Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public
and Professional Life (1999), pp. 104–108.
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is to withhold or mischaracterize information about the client’s
preferences, such as willingness to litigate or to accept particular
settlement terms.90 A lawyer who has mastered these tactics can cut
costs and gain advantages for the client and, in some circumstances,
for himself as well.91
In the debate over lawyers’ obligations of truthfulness, one
view is that lawyers should be held, morally and legally, to the
same standards as non-lawyers.92 Others, however, have argued
on various grounds that special role-based moral standards permit
lawyers to engage in what otherwise would be unacceptably
deceptive practices. For example, some say that artful advocacy by
lawyers is permissible when it is done for a good cause.93 Some have
suggested that a lawyer’s participation in an adversary legal system
justifies the lawyer in arguing what he does not believe because
unfettered argument on all sides will ultimately lead to fair and just
outcomes.94 Some have even maintained that deception by lawyers
90 See Applbaum, supra note 89, at pp. 104–105 (discussing negotiating
tactics).
91 On contingency fees, see generally Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan,
Improving on the Contingency Fee, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 529 (1978).
92 For extensive analyses of role morality, see Applbaum, supra note 89; David
Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988). Applbaum comes close to
the position described in the text. He rejects the “argument from redescription,”
which proposes, for example, that misrepresentation by a lawyer is advocacy, and
therefore cannot count as a lie. See Applbaum, supra, at pp. 76–109. He accepts
that roles may create moral permissions, but only in exceedingly narrow circum-
stances that are unlikely to obtain in settings such as law, politics, and business.
Ibid., at pp. 113–135. Otherwise, acts performed within a role must be judged all-
things-considered according to their persistent pre-practice descriptions. Ibid., at
pp. 89–98. See also Wolfram, supra note 85, at pp. 725–726 (favoring disclosure
standards for lawyers equivalent to those that apply to non-lawyers).
93 See Tigar, supra note 88, at p. xiv (“The well-lived life of the advocate must
include concern for how we use those tools. Their highest and best use is against
government attempts to stifle democratic rights and to use state power in illegiti-
mate ways”). See also Mellinkoff, supra note 84, at pp. 248–249 (associating this
view with Sir Matthew Hale and Jeremy Taylor).
94 See, e.g., Basil Montagu, Essays and Selections (1837), pp. 266–267
(an advocate acts under the assumption that “truth is elicited and difficulties
disentangled by the opposite statements of able men”). Jerome Frank quotes
Baron Macaulay, without citation, as stating “that we obtain the fairest decision
‘when two men argue, as unfairly as possible, on opposite sides,’ for then ‘it is
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does not count as true deception, because no one expects a lawyer
to be truthful.95 (If, however, no one expects a lawyer to be truthful
in these contexts, then just how are we to explain what the lawyer is
doing in making false assertions?)
The A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit
lawyers from engaging in “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation.”96 However, specific provisions are less inclusive and
suggest at least a limited privilege for deception in the interest of
effective advocacy. In arguing a case before a court, a lawyer must
not “make a false statement of material fact or law,” fail to disclose
certain that no important consideration will altogether escape notice’.” Jerome
Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (1949), p. 80. Frank
refers to this view derisively as “the ‘fight’ theory, a theory which derives from
the origins of trials in substitutes for out-of-court brawls.” Ibid. Samuel Johnson is
reported to have said that it is not the role of the advocate to judge truth: “an argu-
ment, which does not convince yourself, may convince the Judge to whom you
urge it: and if it does convince him, why then, Sir, you are wrong, and he is right.”
1 James Boswell, Boswell’s Life of Johnson, in Chauncey B. Tinker (ed.) (1933),
pp. 366–367. See also Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Report,
44 A.B.A. J., pp. 1159, 1160–1161 (defending partisan advocacy as “the only
effective means for combating [the] natural tendency to judge too swiftly in terms
of the familiar that which is not yet fully known”); Charles Fried, “The Lawyer as
Friend”, Yale L. J. 85 (1975), pp. 1060, 1066 (suggesting that lawyers are morally
justified in favoring the interests of clients in ways that may be harmful to others
or to society because the lawyer occupies a role analogous to that of a friend).
Cf. Applbaum, supra note 89, at pp. 199–200 (suggesting that the claim that
connection between zealous legal advocacy and ultimate legal truth unproven);
Roscoe Pound, “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice”, A.B.A. Rep. 29 (1906), pp. 395, 404–406 (criticizing the “sporting
theory of justice,” which American lawyers take as “a fundamental legal tenet”);
Luban, supra note 92, at pp. 50–149 (reviewing and criticizing arguments for
role morality based on participation in an adversary legal system and concluding
that, outside the criminal law, reasons supporting the adversary system are too
weak to support a broad moral justification for partisan deviation from otherwise
applicable moral standards).
95 See Boswell, supra note 94, at p. 367 (quoting Johnson as stating that
“Everyone knows you are paid for affecting warmth for your client; and it is,
therefore, properly no dissimulation”); Mellinkoff, supra note 84, at pp. 249–
257 (discussing the view that a lawyer’s representations are too inherently
unbelievable to count as deception).
96 A.B.A Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4(c) (1983) [hereinafter
MRPC].
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authority that is directly adverse and controlling, or offer evidence
the lawyer knows to be false.97 Yet, comments state that the lawyer
“usually is not required to have personal knowledge” of matters
asserted in litigation documents; in other words, the lawyer may
assert what the client has told him if he does not know it to be
false.98 The comments also emphasize that “the lawyer’s discus-
sion of law need not be disinterested.”99 As to evidence, the lawyer
“may” refuse to present evidence he “reasonably believes” to be
false, implying that he may also choose to present the evidence if
he believes but does not know that it is false.100
Another set of rules governs lawyers’ truthfulness in dealing
with private parties who are not clients. A lawyer may not make
a “false statement of material fact or law” to another party.101 The
lawyer must also disclose material facts if disclosure is necessary
97 MRCP Rule 3.3(a).
98 Ibid., comment [2].
99 Ibid., comment [3].
100 Ibid., comment [14]. See Wolfram, supra note 85, at pp. 655–656 (lawyers
have discretion, but no duty, to refuse to present evidence they believe to be false).
The Model Rules also provide that in arguing before a jury, a lawyer must not
“state a personal opinion as to the justice of a cause.” MRPC Rule 3.4(e); see
Mellinkoff, supra note 84, at p. 60 (referring to Canon 15 of the 1908 A.B.A
Canons of Professional Ethics as the most violated of all the rules of ethics).
Lawyers, however, sometimes circumvent this requirement by suggesting their
belief in the client’s cause in the guise of analyzing evidence. For example,
in a book on legal argumentation, the criminal defense lawyer Michael Tigar
analyzes a successful closing argument by Edward Bennett Williams on behalf
of John Connally, who was accused of taking bribes from a lobbyist for milk
price supports during his tenure as Secretary of the Treasury. Williams posed the
question whether testimony by a government witness of dubious veracity estab-
lished Connally’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Addressing the jury, he then
stated, “I don’t think you can say that.” Tigar interjects his commentary:
Did he step over the line by saying ‘I don’t think?’ An advocate cannot express
a personal belief in the client’s cause. He or she may, however, say what the
evidence shows. What Williams said does not, in my view, cross that line . . .
As a matter of tactics, however, one should be careful to inject a personal view.
You want the jurors to see their way to a conclusion, the better to hold on to it.
Tigar, supra note 88, at pp. 180–181.
101 MRPC Rule 4.1(a).
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to “avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.”102
However, comments to the rules state that “under generally accepted
conventions of negotiation,” estimates of price or value, or inten-
tions about acceptable settlement, are not considered statements of
fact.103 Thus, the lawyer’s obligation to avoid false statements is
subject to at least the same qualifications found in tort and contract
law, and may be further limited to “statements” of fact, as distinct
from half-truths or other forms of deception. Moreover, the lawyer’s
duty of disclosure is expressly made subject to the potentially
conflicting duty to protect client confidences.104 The lawyer may
suppress information relating to his representation of a client, even
when disclosure would otherwise be required under tort and contract
rules – for example, to correct an evident mistake of the other party
about facts that are basic to the transaction.105 In this way, the A.B.A
rules create an immunity from otherwise applicable law for lawyers
acting within their professional roles.
2. Legal Fictions
English and American courts have a long tradition of using or
tolerating legal fictions as means for adapting law to new circum-
stances.106 The earliest fictions were ingenious devices for circum-
venting the rigid rules of medieval procedure. For example, in
102 Ibid., Rule 4.1(b).
103 Ibid., comment [2].
104 Ibid. See Wolfram, supra note 85, at pp. 723–726 (finding the client confi-
dence exception unwarranted). For a reading of the history surrounding Rule
4.1(b) that minimizes the confidentiality requirement, see Nathan M. Crystal,
“The Lawyer’s Duty to Disclose Material Facts in Contract or Settlement Negoti-
ations”, Ky. L. J. 87 (1998–1999), pp. 1055, 1983–1988 (suggesting that matters
other than client wrongdoing must be disclosed). The latest version of the Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers does not exempt confidential information
from disclosure requirements, and suggest that ordinary tort and contract rules
governing misrepresentation and nondisclosure apply to lawyers. See Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, §§61–67, 93 (1999).
105 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §551(2)(e); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §161(d).
106 See, e.g., Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the
Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas, Sir Frederick Pollack
(ed.) (1907), pp. 26–32 (discussing three methods of legal change: legal fiction,
equity, and legislation; and tracing the origins of legal fiction in Roman law);
Baker, supra note 43, at pp. 230–232; Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, p. 53 (refer-
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the writ system as it crystallized in the fourteenth century, only
primitive writs involving cumbersome procedures were available to
landowners who were ousted from possession.107 Lessees, on the
other hand, could challenge third parties who interfered with their
possession using the much simpler writ of ejectment, a form of
trespass action that was tried before a jury. To obtain the advan-
tages of ejectment, landowners’ lawyers devised a plan in which
the landowner leased his land nominally to a friend and put the
friend in possession. The friendly lessee then brought an action of
ejectment against the wrongful possessor, with the approval of the
court. By the seventeenth century, the fiction had evolved to a point
at which the aggrieved landowner brought an action of ejectment in
the name of an imaginary lessee, John Doe, against Richard Roe,
the imaginary lessee of the real defendant (the wrongful possessor).
When Roe, who was invented and controlled by the landowner’s
lawyer, “appeared” in the action, the court permitted the real
defendant to intervene on Roe’s behalf, but only if the defendant
consented to abide by the Doe-Roe fiction. This procedure led to the
demise of the old writs for recovery of land, which were eventually
superseded by the fictitious ejectment.108
ring to “historical fiction”). For a negative view, see 5 Jeremy Bentham, Works,
John Bowring (ed.) (1843), p. 92 (calling legal fiction “a syphilis”).
107 The writ of right, the writ of entry, and the assize of novel disseisin are
discussed in Baker, supra note 43, at pp. 262–271. The writ of right originally was
tried by “battle” – a stylized combat between the parties or their representatives.
See ibid., at pp. 68–69.
108 The ejectment fiction is discussed by Baker, ibid., at pp. 341–343. Another
notable procedural fiction developed to enforce debts. The old writ of debt
involved the much-despised procedure of wager of law, in which the defendant
produced twelve oath-helpers to swear in his favor. Ibid., at pp. 6–7. The newer
action of assumpsit, a form of trespass on the case, allowed for jury trials of
damage claims for breach of promise; however, a rule of the writ system required
the use of older writs in cases to which they applied. To avoid this, lawyers for
plaintiffs seeking to enforce debts began to allege that the defendant, having
contracted a debt to the plaintiff, subsequently promised to pay the debt. The
subsequent promise was fictitious, but it was held sufficient to support an action
of assumpsit in place of the action of debt. The fictitious allegation of a promise to
pay was later used as the basis for claims of unjust enrichment. If, for example, the
defendant stole goods from the plaintiff and sold them, the plaintiff could bring
an action of assumpsit for the proceeds of sale, based on implied but obviously
fictitious promise to pay the money over. This form of implied promise was one
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Courts have also employed or acquiesced in fictions for
substantive ends. Probably the boldest of these was the common
recovery, an action developed in the fifteenth century to avoid
the effects of fees tail. A fee tail, authorized by statute in 1285,
was an estate in which land was given to a grantee and then to
the grantee’s descendants for as long as the line of descendants
continued. Each holder in effect owned only an estate for life, with
title descending automatically and unavoidably to his descendants
at his death. Courts, possibly sensing the inefficiency of such an
source of the modern law of restitution. For fuller discussion, see ibid., at pp. 389–
394, 409–424; John P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment (1951), pp. 10–16. Cases are
collected in J. H. Baker and S. F. C. Milsom, Sources of English Legal History:
Private Law to 1750406-45 (1986), pp. 464–472.
Another interesting procedural fiction was the Bill of Middlesex, which
developed out of competition among the royal courts. Baker, supra note 43,
at pp. 49–51. The court of King’s Bench was prohibited by the Magna Carta
from hearing common pleas, including actions of debt. See ibid., at pp. 46–
47 (explaining that the Magna Carta required trial of common pleas at a fixed
location, a requirement that disqualified the King’s Bench because it theoretically
followed the king). However, if a case that otherwise would be tried as a common
plea was brought against someone already in the custody of the King’s Bench,
or if the case arose in Middlesex county, where the King’s Bench sat, the King’s
Bench could hear the claim under a special bill procedure that did not involve
a writ and was not subject to the jurisdictional restrictions of the Magna Carta.
With this in mind, plaintiffs lawyers devised a scheme. The plaintiff, wishing to
bring an action of debt before the King’s Bench, began by lodging a fictitious
claim of trespass (an action within the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench) against
the defendant. The trespass claim brought the defendant within the custody of
the King’s Bench, whereupon the plaintiff brought his bill of debt against the
defendant. The court, eager for business, heard the debt claim without closely
scrutinizing the claim of trespass on which it depended. The popularity of the bill
procedure, which avoided the need to apply to Chancery for a writ, led to a further
wrinkle: once it was established that the King’s Bench would accept fictitious
trespass claims, plaintiffs began to allege that the supposed trespass occurred in
Middlesex county. This allowed the plaintiff to initiate both the trespass claim and
the debt claim by bill, and avoid the writ procedure altogether. Ibid., at p. 51. This
fiction resulted in a resurgence of business in the King’s Bench, from hundreds to
thousands of cases per year.
Another clever device, developed some centuries later, allowed for jury trials of
issues in Chancery. The Chancery had no jury procedure. However, parties could
obtain a verdict on a contested issue by alleging that they had bet on the fact in
dispute, and bringing an action in the law courts to enforce the bet. See ibid., at
p. 129, n. 71.
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estate, developed a rule holding that a sale of land held in fee tail
was binding on the descendants of the current holder if the holder
left his descendants land of equal value in place of the original land.
Once this rule was in place, lawyers devised a clever procedure to
cut off the descendants, roughly as follows: the current holder of the
fee tail (O) and a potential buyer arranged a collusive suit in which
a third party, X (often a lawyer), sued O and claimed, falsely, to be
the true owner of the land. O answered X’s allegation by naming a
fourth party, Y (often a court clerk), and claiming that Y had granted
him the land and would vouch for his title. Y either defaulted or
admitted that O had no title. In response to Y’s default or admis-
sion, the court entered judgment awarding title to the land to X, and
also entered judgment for O against Y for land of equivalent value.
X then transferred the land to the buyer, and O left his judgment
against Y for equivalent land to his descendants. This judgment, of
course, was worthless, because Y was a nominal party who owned
no land. Every step of the procedure was fictitious, and known to be
so, but it had the salutary result of freeing up the title to the land.109
109 The common recovery is described in Baker, ibid., at pp. 318–321. See
Hethersal v. Mildmay, 6 Co. Rep. 40 (1605), reprinted in Baker and Milsom,
supra note 108, at pp. 164–169 (resolving that a condition that the grantee of a
fee tail may not disentail the estate by common recovery is repugnant to the estate
and therefore invalid).
Grant Gilmore described a fiction that permitted assignment of contract rights
at a time when intangibles were not transferable. The promisee appointed his
intended transferree as an “agent” to collect the debt on his behalf. Over time
the courts treated the fictitious agency as irrevocable, meaning for all practical
purposes, the transferee now owned the debt. 1 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests
in Personal Property (1965), p. 202. See Robert A. Hillman, “Contract Lore”, J.
Corp. L. 27 (2002), p. 505, at p. 513 (discussing this and other fictions).
Another early fiction used for substantive purposes involved the benefit of
clergy. From the time of Henry II’s encounter with Thomas Beckett in the twelfth
century, clerics accused of crimes were triable only in ecclesiastical courts and not
in the common law courts. By the fifteenth century, common law judges, reluctant
to impose the death penalty on all felons as required by law, began to widen the
clergy privilege by fictions. First, anyone who could read a psalm was deemed to
be a cleric and handed over to ecclesiastical authorities; later, anyone who could
recite a psalm was considered a cleric, and, when convenient, a standard psalm
was assigned. Baker reports that by the end of the sixteenth century half of all
felons were granted benefit of clergy. Baker, supra note 43, at pp. 586–589.
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Procedural fictions have for the most part become unnecessary
and been abolished. Similarly, the fee tail estate has been altered or
eliminated through legislative intervention.110 Nevertheless, courts
sometimes still rely on legal fictions to avoid conceptual difficulties
or institutional limitations.111 These legal fictions are deceptive,
not in that anyone is expected to believe them, but in that they
disguise the process of legal change. Yet, they also serve judicial
ends. They enable courts to amend law while maintaining an appear-
ance of continuity. They also downplay the lawmaking function of
judges. By portraying themselves as discovering and applying law,
courts can deflect concerns about the legitimacy of rulemaking by
unelected officials.112
110 Pleading fictions were abolished in England in 1852. Baker, supra note 43,
at p. 107. Interestingly, the common recovery procedure was so widely accepted
that statutory disentailment provisions sometimes refer directly to the fifteenth
century action. E.g., 25 Del. C. §302 (2001) (a deed “shall have the same effect
and operation for barring all estate tail and other interests in the lands . . . as such
persons being a . . . party vouchee to a common recovery”).
111 An example is the doctrine of prescriptive easements. Prescription allows
a person who trespasses openly and repeatedly on another’s land for a long
period of time to obtain an easement, much as the doctrine of adverse possession
allows a wrongful possessor to obtain title after a long period of open posses-
sion. Both doctrines serve policies of repose. Courts have had difficulty, however,
in explaining the legal basis for prescriptive easements. In the case of adverse
possession, courts simply refer to statutes of limitation that cut off remedies for
repossession of land after a fixed period of time. In other words, the wrongful
possessor obtains title by virtue of a legislative act. In the case of prescriptive use,
the statutory explanation does not work; a new cause of action arises with every
use, and as a result, the statute of limitations never conclusively runs.
Searching for a way to recognize prescriptive easements without simply
decreeing that prescription is good policy, courts developed the fiction of a lost
grant: if one person trespasses on another’s land regularly, openly, and adversely
for twenty years, with the passive acquiescence of the landowner, the court
presumes that at one time the landowner must have granted an easement, which
has since been lost. See, e.g., Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1953);
Shellow v. Hagen, 101 N.W.2d 694, 697 (Wisc. 1960). In this way, the court can
recognize the easement and neatly circumvent the problem of judicial authority to
transfer property rights from one person to another. The reasoning is transparently
fictitious, but convenient.
112 Cf. Baker, supra note 43, at pp. 223–230 (discussing medieval understand-
ings of the role of courts and subsequent changes in judicial attitudes toward
lawmaking).
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3. Legal Rules
We have argued previously that, in a sense, legal rules themselves
are deceptive.113 The object of legal rules is to resolve uncertainty
and disagreement about what to do in a manner calculated to serve
agreed ends.114 Often the most effective way to do this is to establish
a determinate rule, requiring all actors to follow a certain course of
action in certain circumstances.115 Individual actors applying their
own best judgment are likely to err, either because they lack infor-
mation about the consequences of their actions, or because they
cannot anticipate what others will do. A rule can reduce errors by
bringing superior information to bear and by coordinating individual
actions.116
Determinate rules, however, are imperfect. To be effective in
preventing error and settling controversy, a rule must simplify and
generalize in ways that produce the wrong result in some cases that
113 Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin, “The Deceptive Nature of Rules”, U.
Penn. O. Rev. 142 (1994), p. 1191.
114 In some cases, when other values are controversial, peace and order may be
the agreed ends. See Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules:
Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law (2001), pp. 11–25).
115 There may be cases in which an indeterminate standard of conduct is prefer-
able, perhaps to allow experimentation and private development of norms. On
the distinction between rules and standards, see, e.g., Isaac Erlich and Richard
A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemanking”, J. Legal Stud. 3
(1974), pp. 257, 261–271; Louis Kaplow, “Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis”, Duke, L. J. 42 (1992), pp. 557, 560–562; Duncan Kennedy, “Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication”, Harv. L. Rev. 89 (1976), pp. 1685,
1695–1701.
116 For general analysis of the function of rules in avoiding errors, see Joseph
Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986), pp. 70–80; Frederick Schauer, Playing By
the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making (1991),
pp. 149–155.
For sources recognizing the function of rules in providing expert guidance,
see, e.g., Tom Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (1996), pp. 51,
58; Schauer, supra at pp. 150–152, 158–159; Jules L. Coleman, “Authority and
Reason”, in R. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (1996), pp. 287, 305.
On the coordination function of rules, see, e.g., Raz, supra at pp. 49–50;
Schauer, supra at pp. 163–166; Gerald Postema, “Coordination and Convention
at the Foundations of Law”, J. Legal Stud. 11 (1982), pp. 165, 172–186; Donald
H. Regan, “Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom”, S.
Cal. L. Rev. 62 (1989), pp. 995, 1006–1010.
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fall within its terms.117 This means that individuals will sometimes
do better, in terms of the objectives of the rule, if they disobey.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the lawmaking authority,
it may be best to insist that everyone follow the rule in all cases. If
individuals attempt to determine when the rule yields correct results
and when it does not, they will make the same errors the rule is
supposed to prevent. As long as the sum of error is less if all actors
obey than if all reevaluate the accuracy of the rule in each case, the
ends of the rule will be better served by universal compliance.118
Accordingly, to obtain optimal results, the lawmaking authority
must avoid presenting its rule as a rule of thumb, to be followed
unless some other course of action appears more likely to serve the
purposes of the rule. It must instead offer the rule as a requirement
applicable in every case it governs. Another way to put this is that,
although the authority’s rules are in fact imperfect rules, prescribing
actions that will produce good results in most but not all cases, the
authority must present them as perfect rules, stating what should,
invariably, be done. It must deceive its subjects by stating the rules
in absolute terms and suppressing their flawed and instrumental
character.
Perhaps this should not count as “deception” if the authority
is prepared to enforce the rules according to their terms. It then
becomes true that people should always follow the rule, at least
if they wish to avoid sanctions.119 However, no legal system can
117 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 116, at pp. 31–34, 47–54 (discussing the over-
inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness of determinate general rules, in relation to
their underlying objectives). A rule that specified exactly what to do in all contin-
gencies would be hopelessly complex; a rule that simply referred to the ends to
be achieved would fail to prevent error and settle controversy.
One exception to the observation that determinate rules are imperfect is
a coordination rule that simply designates one of several equally convenient
alternatives, and from which there is never a reason to deviate.
118 We analyze this difficulty in depth in Alexander and Sherwin, supra note
114, at pp. 53–95.
119 This raises interesting questions about the extent to which negative effects
of sanctions, both on the actor and on others, count as reasons to obey, and
what should follow if the actor nevertheless justifiably or nonculpably wishes
to disobey. See ibid., at pp. 77–84 (discussing various difficulties affecting sanc-
tions); Heidi M. Hurd, Moral Combat (1999), pp. 208–213 (discussing possible
reasons for and against imposing sanctions on justified actors).
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detect, much less punish, all violations of its rules; instead, the
legal system relies on individuals’ taking the rules to be conclusive
reasons for obedience even in the many instances in which indi-
viduals can disobey the rules with impunity. Moreover, even when
violations are detected, announced rules are not always and fully
enforced.
Adjudication is a central feature of American law: we have an
extensive system of courts, authorized to settle disputes that arise
under rules and equipped for the purpose with a variety of civil and
criminal remedies. The court system, as well as the rules themselves,
carry the implication that when disputes arise, they will resolved
according to the rules. If the rules of contract law state that a valid
contract gives the promisee a right to the benefit of his bargain, it
is natural to assume that courts will use their remedial powers to
enforce that right.
Yet, because rules are imperfect, cases will arise in which an
individual actor has rightly broken a rule. That is, judged by the
purposes of the rule, the actor was justified in violating it. Cases
will also arise in which the actor, although not justified in breaking
the rule, is not morally blameworthy. The promisee may have over-
reached in ways not captured by the rules of contract formation, and
in the circumstances a breach by the promisor may seem excusable,
if not admirable. In situations of this kind, it is difficult and possibly
immoral for courts to strictly enforce the applicable rule.120
Courts typically carry through on the systemic implication that
rules will be enforced according to their terms. In difficult cases,
however, courts often find ways to deviate quietly from announced
rules of conduct.121 For example, they may invoke little-known
120 For discussion of the morality of punishing justified actors, see Hurd, supra
note 119, at pp. 203–225, 253–293 (identifying but ultimately rejected reasons
for punishment). For analysis of the difficulties of full enforcement of rules, see
Alexander and Sherwin, supra note 114, at pp. 77–86.
121 For discussions of the possibility of maintaining distinct sets of conduct rules
and decision rules within a legal system, see Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the
Common Law Tradition (1986), pp. 403–408, 448–452 (interpreting Bentham);
Meir Dan-Cohen, “Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
the Criminal Law”, Harv. L. Rev. 97 (1984), p. 625. See also Schauer, supra note
116, at pp. 648–650 (suggesting that punishment for rule violations be limited to
those whose violations were in fact unjustified).
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exceptions to the rules, or they may modify the outcome of the rules
by choosing limited remedies. Thus, in a contract dispute the court
might acknowledge that a breach has occurred but refuse to give the
remedy of specific performance and instead limit the plaintiff to a
damage remedy. The damage remedy in turn, although in theory
designed to give the plaintiff the monetary value of the bargain,
may in fact fall short because of hidden limitations and costs. When
the various remedial details are worked out, the plaintiff may not
receive the full value of his bargain with the promisor, and so may
not realize his supposed legal entitlement.122
Of course, remedial doctrines and other limitations on enforce-
ment are part of the set of rules governing any legal right and
are available to those who can navigate legal sources. Yet, if the
basic rules of conduct are clearly and prominently announced, while
limiting doctrines are relatively obscure, the limitations may not be
noticed and when noticed may not be fully understood. If so, there is
a disparity between what the system leads ordinary citizens to expect
and what they actually obtain from adjudication of a dispute.123
This is not to say that lawmakers set out deliberately to mislead
citizens about either the bluntness of the rules or the existence of
qualifications that may limit full enforcement. More likely, these
features of the system evolve without design and are made use
of without being the focus of anyone’s attention.124 The result,
however, is that law is not always what it appears to be.
122 For a fuller discussion , see Emily L. Sherwin, “Law and Equity in Contract
Enforcement”, Md. L. Rev. 50 (1991), pp. 253, 300–314. Dan-Cohen points to a
number of similar examples in criminal law, such as lesser evils defense. Dan-
Cohen, supra note 121, at pp. 632–634.
123 A similar but somewhat more benign possibility is that courts and legal
scholars may sometimes repeat morally attractive propositions of “law” which
are practically unattainable and therefore not in fact reflected in the outcomes of
legal disputes. Robert Hillman has traced examples of this phenomenon in the
field of contracts. Hillman, supra note 109, at p. 515 (discussing “contract lore,”
which “represents contracts people’s aspirations – their strong preference for how
contract law should operate if realities did not preclude it”).
124 For interesting discussions of the possibility of self-deception, see Goldman,
supra note 22, at pp. 67–71, Nyberg, supra note 1, at pp. 81–108.
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III. LAW AND MORALITY
A. Summary and Observations
Predominant moral theories either prohibit lying absolutely or adopt
a strong rule or presumption against lying, subject only to narrow
exceptions. The most stringent non-consequentialist theories hold
that lies are inherently offensive to natural law, the humanity of the
liar, or linguistic imperatives. Other non-consequentialist theories
condemn most if not all lies because of the harm they cause to
the autonomy of the person lied to. Another essentially consequen-
tialist form of argument focuses on the harm lies cause to the social
foundation of mutual trust. Philosophers of various stripes also
tend to distinguish between lying and non-lying deception, with the
sharpest distinctions drawn by those who view lying as intrinsically
wrong.
Legal treatment of deception begins with a seemingly broad
prohibition that does not distinguish between lying and non-lying
deception. Details of legal doctrine, however, cut back on the initial
prohibition. In some contexts, much narrower rules apply. More
generally, requirements such as concrete harm, justified reliance,
and materiality limit legal relief for proven deception and defer
significantly to extra-legal custom. Although legal rules governing
deception have tended to become stricter over time, the exemp-
tions and qualifications we have described are still a vital part of
the law.125 In addition, legal prohibitions against deception sit side
by side with the law’s own willingness to use or endorse deceptive
practices in furtherance of systemic ends.
These general descriptions suggest that law diverges importantly
from moral theory. Legal rules are more lenient than most moral
theories, at least with respect to lies, and they deviate markedly
from the logic of leading deontologial theories. To some extent,
the comparative leniency of law may be due to institutional limita-
tions on law: perfect enforcement of moral standards is not possible,
and the means for approaching perfect enforcement would not be
desirable. Yet our descriptive summaries suggest some substantive
divergence as well.
125 See Farnsworth, supra note 38, at pp. 409, 419 (noting trends); Prosser and
Keeton, supra note 38, at pp. 739, 751–752, 759 (noting trends).
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Turning to particular moral theories, legal rules do not track, even
loosely, arguments based on the liar’s violation of natural law, his
own humanity, or the rules of language. If these arguments were
influential, one would expect to see criminal laws extending beyond
property transactions and tort rules permitting recovery without
proof of pecuniary damage. Further, because the logic of these argu-
ments depends on the evils of false assertion, one would expect
legal rules inspired by them to distinguish pointedly between lying
and non-lying deception. And, of course, one would not expect the
exemptions and qualifications that provide legal immunity to some
forms of lies.
Nor does law correspond to moral theories that emphasize the
effect of deception on the victim’s autonomy. Law is certainly
concerned with preventing and compensating for harm to victims
of deception, but it seldom addresses injuries one might associate
with autonomy. If autonomy were the focus of legal concern, one
would expect regulation of fraud in sexual relations, which is in
essence an affront to autonomy. One would also expect to see
criminal and civil remedies that vindicated an interest in freedom
from manipulation, with or without accompanying economic harm.
A few decisions appear to recognize such an interest, but courts
do not regularly protect a free-standing autonomy-based right
not to be deceived. Instead, they prohibit deception as a means
of causing harm to independently recognized interests, such as
the interests in bodily integrity, property, physical liberty, and
reputation.
Legal rules governing lying and deception are more compatible
with the branch of moral theory that focuses on harm to the back-
ground of trust within society. The law’s evenhanded treatment of
lies and non-lying forms of deception is consistent with the goal of
maintaining critical levels of trust. The requirement of justified reli-
ance, with its content often drawn from custom, can be explained as
excluding behavior that does not affect trust because it is not heeded
by typical members of society. Fiduciary duties can be explained
as providing added protection when trust is deemed particu-
larly important, either for economic or institutional reasons or
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because of special human vulnerability in matters such as health or
religion.126
Yet, the correspondence between legal treatment of deception and
moral theories concerned with trust is not perfect. A legal regime
that placed overriding importance on preservation of a social atmo-
sphere conducive to trust would penalize deception even when no
victim was actually misled. Our law, in contrast, requires proof that
the victim believed and relied. More generally, legal regulation of
deception fails to conform to the near-absolute rule recommended
by moral theorists who focus on the importance of trust. At best,
therefore, law conforms to arguments based on trust only insofar as
they are cast as part of a broader consequentialist theory that admits
the possibility that competing goods may take priority over trust.
In sum, the pattern of legal regulation betrays an ambivalent atti-
tude toward deception that departs from much of moral theory and
is not unlike the position sketched by David Nyberg. Legal rules
attempt to remedy significant concrete harms that follow from lies
and deception, and they plausibly seek to maintain a level of trust.
At the same time, they fall short of consistent, principled condem-
nation, and their frequent reference to customary practice suggests
that they acknowledge the social functions of deception.
B. Possible Reasons for Legal Divergence from Moral Theory
We have shown that legal regulation of deception is at odds with
most moral positions on deception. In this section, we suggest
some possible reasons why law does not regulate deception more
pervasively. Some of these reasons are practical and institutional
and therefore help to explain the gap between law and moral theory.
Others, however, indicate a more substantive divide. We suspect that
all these reasons are at work to varying extents.
1. High Costs of Regulation
One possible explanation for legal tolerance of deception is that
the costs of regulation are too high. This explanation is consistent
with the position that deception is seriously wrong in all or nearly
126 An example of an institutional reason to give special protection to trust is
the bond between lawyer and client that is deemed essential to adversary legal
procedures.
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all cases. Given scarce resources, a society might wish to eradicate
deceptive behavior and yet conclude either that practical considera-
tions rule out full enforcement or that other values take priority. This
explanation posits that lawmakers have given up, reluctantly, on the
ideal of eliminating deceptive behavior.
Several types of costs are involved in regulating deception. The
most obvious are administrative costs of enforcing legal claims.
Deception can be difficult to detect, even after the fact.127 Moreover,
even when claimants are prepared to prove that deception occurred,
dispute resolution imposes costs on both the private parties involved
and collectively funded legal institutions. If these costs are too great
to bear in light of other needs, lawmakers must narrow the scope of
regulation, for example by denying legal recourse to those who have
not suffered measurable economic harm.128
Another cost frequently cited by courts and legal commentators
as a reason to limit relief for deception is the shadow cast over
completed transactions by the possibility of damages or rescis-
sion.129 Concern for the stability of transactions might, for example,
support a materiality requirement that screens out minor misrepre-
sentation.130 This cost must be discounted in the context of inten-
tional misrepresentation, because guilty defendants are not likely
to be taken by surprise when their transactions are overturned. Yet,
transactional instability remains a problem insofar as courts err in
determining whether an intentional misrepresentation has in fact
occurred.
A third cost of pervasive legal regulation of deception is too much
official intrusion into private life. Costs of this kind are especially
127 Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni, “Free Competition and the Optimal
Amount of Fraud”, J. L. and Econ. 16 (1973), pp. 67, 68–77 (analyzing cases
in which providers of repair service falsely diagnose a need for the service).
128 A caveat to this point is that the capacity of the legal system may be at least
as influential in determining the number of disputes litigated as the recognition
of particular causes of action. See George L. Priest, “Private Litigants and the
Court Congestion Problem”, B. U. L. Rev. 69 (1989), p. 527 (arguing that the
effect of congestion on litigation decisions produces a litigation equilibrium that
is independent of the content of decisional standards).
129 See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton, Torts, supra note 38, at p. 753 (discussing
materiality); cf. Farnsworth, Contracts, supra note 38, at p. 400 (discussing
rescission for defects in the bargaining process).
130 See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 38, at p. 753.
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worrisome in connection with relief for emotional and dignitary
harms resulting from deception. Consider, for example, the case
of Earl v. Saks, in which the donee of a fur coat colluded with a
store clerk to disguise the full price of the coat. To make an accurate
assessment of intangible harm suffered by the donor, a court would
need to know, among other things, the nature of the relationship
between donor and donee and the reason for its demise. Although
courts do sometimes undertake investigations of this kind – for
example, in determining damages for wrongful death – the process
of judicial factfinding is a blunt tool for the purpose.131 Moreover,
even if factfinding were reliable, state intervention in the details of
human interaction runs contrary to the ideals of privacy and personal
liberty. For this reason, intervention itself counts as a cost.132
Thus, pervasive regulation of deceptive conduct would entail
costs of various magnitude. Yet, none of these costs is an abso-
lute bar to more stringent regulation than now exists. Without
an unprecedented expansion of legal machinery, courts could, for
example, discard the notion that reliance on misrepresentation must
be justified, and extend relief to a wider field of intangible harms
resulting from deception. Courts have long taken a stricter approach
131 On damages for wrongful death, see generally Dobbs, supra note 38, at
pp. 439–445. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is now
well established. However, courts have been careful to limit it to “extreme and
outrageous” conduct causing “serious” distress. See Restatment (Second) of Torts
§46 and comment b (1977).
132 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, comment d (1977) (“There is no
occasions for the law to intervene in every case where some one’s feeling are
hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion . . .”).
For an interesting judicial excursion into the details of private life, which
suggests both the difficulty of accurate fact-finding and the intrusiveness of the
intervention, see Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d 721 (1976), in which a farmer,
age 56, deeded his property to a schoolteacher, age 40, in the hope that she
would marry him. When she later refused to marry him and evicted him from
the farm, the court found her conduct contrary to the understandings inherent in
the relationship, and imposed a constructive trust.
Feminists have often observed that the state of the law, including not only its
explicit requirements but also its omissions, inevitably shapes private life. Without
denying that law has this effect, we think that adjudicatory scrutiny of the details
of human interchange to identify behavior such as fraud raises distinct concerns
for a legal system.
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to wrongs such as battery, defamation, and trespass to land.133 They
also tighten the reins on deception itself when deception occurs in
the context of a relationship deemed to be fiduciary. Accordingly,
costs of regulation cannot be the only reason why law tolerates many
instances of deception.
2. Superiority of Informal Enforcement
Another possible explanation for imperfect legal regulation is that
the legal system defers to informal social processes to control decep-
tion. For example, legal remedies might be limited to tangible harm
on the assumption that peer groups are better able both to evalu-
ate intangible harms from deception and to punish the deceiver
by expressing their disapproval. Similarly, law might exempt from
regulation statements made in the context of sexual relations, or
statements of opinion or intention, on the assumption that peers
have a better understanding of the implications of statements of this
kind.
Informal enforcement of norms of deception has several advan-
tages over formal legal enforcement. It avoids the direct institu-
tional costs of legal enforcement because it relies on naturally
occurring social processes such as gossip, ostracism, and character
signalling.134 At least in some contexts, informal processes may
result in more sensitive factfinding. Those who know the parties may
have insights about their intentions and understandings that would
elude a court.135 Social sanctions also may be more effective and
more satisfying to victims, particularly when the consequences of
deception are not monetary. Finally, although informal enforcement
relies on community oversight of conduct, it at least avoids intrusion
by the state and its organized means of coercion.
133 See text at note 54, supra.
134 See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000), pp. 18–27 (proposing that
people adopt and conform to norms as a way to signal their cooperative natures).
135 Theories of evolutionary psychology suggest that humans have evolved
specialized abilities to detect cheating in their interactions with others, and
also to detect traits such as trustworthiness in partners. See Thomas A Smith,
“Equality, Evolution, and Partnership Law”, J. of Bioeconomics 3, pp. 99,
110–114 (discussing the literature and suggesting its application to partnership
law).
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In principle, a shift of responsibility from legal to non-legal
enforcement mechanisms can be reconciled with the view that
deception is always or nearly always wrong. A society might
conclude that deception should be eliminated to the greatest extent
possible but that the goal of elimination is best served by allowing
social processes to operate without interference.136 In practice,
however, social norms are not entirely condemnatory of deception,
at least not to the extent recommended by moral theory. To take
one of many examples, those who understate their willingness to
buy in negotiations with a car dealership are not ostracized by
society.
Moreover, legal rules sometimes incorporate norms that, rather
than penalize deceivers, require potential victims to be on their
guard. For example, the requirement of justified reliance implies
that victims bear responsibility if they fail to live up to a standard
of common sense. Similarly, sellers are not liable for puffing
because “buyers are expected to understand that they are not entitled
to rely.”137 According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
misrepresentation is not actionable if the victim failed to act “in
good faith and according to reasonable standards of fair dealing.”138
In these cases, the legal system, through its reliance on informal
norms, shifts responsibility to the victim to prevent harm.
Thus, deference to informal enforcement does not necessarily
reconcile law and moral theory; it can equally be viewed as
confirming that law sometimes treats lying and other deception as
benign. Nor can informal enforcement explain all the instances in
which law allows deception. As will appear in the next section, some
elements of legal doctrine are more easily interpreted as protective
of deception than as designed to control costs or shift responsibility.
136 Cf. David Skeel and William Stuntz, “More Law Won’t Work”, Int’l Herald
Tribune (July 11, 2002) (arguing that enactment of new criminal laws in the
wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals is futile because “[c]riminal laws
lead people to focus on what is legal rather than what is right.”).
137 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §169, comment b (1981).
138 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §172 (1981).
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3. Benefits of Deception
A third possibility is that law exempts some forms of deception
from regulation, not because they are unreachable or better reached
by other means, but because they are desirable. In other words,
society has determined not to intervene to prevent or punish certain
instances of deception, including instances of lying, because it does
not wish to eliminate them. To the extent this explanation is correct,
law is evidently in conflict with both non-consequentialist moral
theories and with those consequentialist theories that endorse a rule
against deception.
Some potential benefits of deception are fairly obvious. In the
right circumstances, deception can prevent serious harm, as in the
case of the murderer who asks whether the victim is at home. Decep-
tion can be helpful in paternalistic ways, as when friends and family
conceal bad news from a sick person, or simply civil, as when a
guest claims to have enjoyed dinner. Concealment of one’s own
personal failings or flaws can bolster self-confidence in dealing with
others. These benefits are thought to be irrelevant by strict deontolo-
gists such as Kant and insubstantial by consequentialists such as
Mill, but they often affect practical decisions.
More interesting for analysis of law are instances of efficient
deception: deception that benefits the deceiver at the expense of his
victim, and yet, if permitted by law, will tend to maximize overall
welfare. Efficient deception is a counterintuitive notion: deception
typically meets with strong disapproval from welfare economists.
The most obvious reason for this is that by inducing false beliefs,
deception undermines the normal assumption that consensual trans-
actions produce mutual benefit.139 Deception may also lead to
inappropriate use of resources, and to unproductive expenditures
both on deception itself and on protecting against deception.140
Nevertheless, legal scholars have identified various situations in
which non-disclosure or fraud may have economic benefits. For
example, Anthony Kronman has argued that a legal right to withhold
pertinent information in contractual negotiations can provide incen-
tives to gather information, which in turn will increase the likelihood
139 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, §4.6, 6th edn. (2003).
140 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 3rd edn. (1999),
p. 276.
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of efficient exchange. More specifically, Kronman recommends that
liability for nondisclosure in ordinary contractual settings should be
limited to information acquired casually and should not extend to
information that can only be acquired through effort. A homeowner
who learns by observation that his home is infested with termites
has not conducted a search for valuable information and therefore
should be required to disclose his information to a buyer. But a buyer
who determines through geological investigation that minerals lie
under a parcel of land should be allowed to suppress his discovery
in negotiations to buy the land, so that future buyers will have reason
to invest in geological research.141
Others have argued that even when information is acquired casu-
ally, a rule permitting informed parties to trade without disclosing
what they know is desirable because it encourages useful specu-
lation. Speculative trading moves market prices in a direction that
reflects the speculator’s information, and the resulting price changes
send signals that guide efficient decision-making about resource use.
If trading on private information is prohibited, parties with informa-
tion will have no incentive to reveal it, and it may not reach the
market.142
141 Anthony T Kronman, “Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts”, J. Legal Stud. 7 (1978), pp. 1, 9–13. See Posner, supra note 139, at
§4.6 (discussing termites).
Kronman’s analysis is not universally accepted. Kim Scheppele, for example,
argues that Kronman both fails to account for the pattern of decided cases and
underestimates the inefficiencies that follow from lack of information. See Kim
Land Scheppele, Legal Secrets (1988), pp. 32–36, 161–167. To arrive at her own
position on nondisclosure, Scheppele employs a contractarian analysis, which
yields a principle of equality of information. This principle in turn dictates that
“deep secrets” – those the uninformed party does not suspect to exist – must be
disclosed. See ibid., at pp. 119–124. See also Alan Strudler, “Moral Complexity
in the Law of Nondisclosure”, U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 45 (1997), pp. 337, 349–384
(rejecting the positions of both Kronman and Scheppele, and proposing instead
that liability for nondisclosure should be resolved according to a deontological
principle of “deserved advantage” in bargaining).
142 See Christopher T. Wonnell, “The Structure of a General Theory of
Disclosure”, Case W. Res. L. Rev. 41 (1991), pp. 329, 351–360 (also noting costs
of speculation that make futures markets preferable to direct buying); Randy E.
Barnett, “Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical
Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud”, Harv. J. L. and Publ. Pol. 15 (1992),
pp. 783, 797–799. In general, lack of information affecting supply and demand
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Saul Levmore has pointed out that rules permitting those in
possession of information to trade without disclosure are not enough
to secure benefits of this kind. If courts are serious about encour-
aging production and revelation of information through trade, they
must also permit false assertions. Otherwise, a party who lacks
information can always ask a blanket question such as, “Do you have
information pertinent to the value of the goods?” If a false answer
to this question triggers liability for fraud, incentives to search or
reveal will be lost.143 The impact of this reasoning can be seen in
contract rules providing that reliance on a statement of intention
is not justified if misstatements of intention are “consistent with
reasonable standards of dealing.”144
Levmore has also suggested another way in which deception
can be efficient. In cases of situational monopoly, non-disclosure
or affirmative fraud can preempt hold-out strategies. Suppose, for
example, that a developer needs to make a series of land purchases
to support a project. If the developer’s plan is known, opportunistic
landowners may demand high prices. Yet profits secured by hold-out
sellers are monopolistic, and the sellers’ demands may ultimately
defeat an otherwise efficient plan. If the developer is permitted to
suppress or even lie about his intentions for the land, the hold-out
problem may not arise.145
leads to inefficient use of resources. For example, both Wonnell and Barnett
cite Laidlaw v. Organ, in which a buyer purchased tobacco without revealing
his knowledge that the war of 1812 had ended. Without information about a
peace treaty, farmers might avoid planting tobacco. However, a large speculative
purchase will signal increased demand, telling farmers to plant. But without the
opportunity to profit from trade, those in possession of the information have no
reason to reveal it through action. See Wonnell, supra, at pp. 352–353.
143 Saul Levmore, “Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of
Contracts”, Va. L. Rev. 68 (1992), pp. 117, 140. See also Barnett, supra note 142,
at pp. 799–801. Barnett writes from a perspective that emphasizes consent rather
than efficiency. He points out that if parties to an exchange could ask blanket
questions about pertinent information and demand truthful answers, the practice
“would virtually eliminate the institution within which both buyer and seller are
operating.” Accordingly, Barnett proposes a rule holding that misrepresentation
about “extrinsic” conditions affecting supply and demand should not count as a
defense to contractual obligation.
144 See text at notes 74–75, supra.
145 Levmore, supra note 143, at pp. 140–144.
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Along similar lines, Christopher Wonnell has proposed that
suppression of information can have economic benefits whenever
one party is in a position to take action that will raise the value
of others’ property but lacks sufficient incentives to do so. In such
a case, allowing the potential actor to buy the position of those
who will benefit without disclosing his plans adds an incentive for
him to carry out the beneficial act. Suppose, for example, that a
developer is considering a project that will incidentally raise the
value of surrounding land. Profits from the project alone are not
sufficient to support an investment; however, taking into account the
positive externalities it confers on surrounding property, the project
represents an efficient use of resources. Although no information-
gathering or hold-out problems are present, under the right condi-
tions a privilege that allows the developer to withhold information
in negotiations to buy the surrounding land – or, by Levmore’s
extension, to lie – may allow the project to go forward.146
Deception may have other economic functions. In some circum-
stances, deception might encourage efficient exchange by facili-
tating division of surplus gains from trade. Suppose a potential buyer
and seller are discussing a simple exchange of cash for goods. The
buyer in fact values the goods more than the seller, so the contem-
plated exchange is efficient. To fix a price, however, the parties must
agree on how to divide the mutual benefit resulting from the trade.
If they cannot allocate this surplus satisfactorily, no transaction will
occur.
Of course, parties often succeed in dividing surplus. Their ability
to do this has been the subject of much study. Game theory predicts
that in an idealized division of known surplus, all else being equal,
rational parties will quickly offer and accept a roughly equal divi-
sion of gains in order to avoid the costs of further delay.147 The
solution of equal division, however, assumes that the parties are
146 See Wonnell, supra note 142, at pp. 346–351.
147 Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory
and the Law, pp. 220–224 (describing Rubenstein bargaining games). This predic-
tion is based on the assumption that the value of the sum to be divided decreases
over time as offers and counter-offers are made. The prospect of this loss,
combined with a process of backward induction about possible offers and counter-
offers, yields a near equal division at the outset. If, however, the parties do not
have equal discount rates, the solution will diverge from equality.
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rational, the amount of surplus is known, and there are no alter-
natives other than to agree on a division or to lose the opportunity
for profit.148 If these conditions do not hold true, there may not be a
unique solution to the game and bargaining may break down.149
See also Smith, supra note 135, at pp. 100–103 (suggesting that equal divi-
sion of gains is a predomienant solution to bargaining, and hence a sound legal
default rule, because bargaining power is likely to be normally distributed in the
population).
148 See ibid., at pp. 220–232 (applying the model to a situation of observable but
not verifiable valuation, in which legal rules provide an exit option for one party).
149 Game theory may reveal other situations in which deception is advantageous.
Suppose, for example, that a society has determined collectively that the privacy
of certain information, such as marital status, disability, or genetic predisposi-
tion to disease, should be protected by a rule that prospective employers may
not inquire about the subject in question. This policy, of course, endorses non-
disclosure. The interesting point, however, is that the no-inquiry rule will be
ineffective to protect privacy unless people are also allowed or even encouraged to
lie. If lying is prohibited, those with desirable qualities (unmarried, not disabled,
resistant to disease) will volunteer information, their information will be credible,
and employers will infer negative information from silence. If, however, appli-
cants are permitted to lie, disclosure of desirable qualities will not be credible and
so will not take place. See Baird, Gertner and Picker, supra note 147, at pp. 92–93.
Another example is this: suppose there are no rules requiring disclosure about
the condition of furnaces in homes for sale. Buyers know that half of all homes for
sale need new furnaces. They are willing to pay $180 for a home that definitely
needs a furnace, $200 for a home that definitely does not, and $190 if they know
nothing about the state of the furnace. Many but not all sellers can find out whether
their homes need new furnaces for $5. Under these circumstances, sellers who
can find out for $5 whether they need furnaces will do so; then those who do not
need furnaces will disclose (in order to obtain a price of $200) and those who
do will remain silent (to keep the price at $190). As long as some sellers do not
know the condition of their furnaces (because finding out would cost them more
than $5), buyers cannot infer from silence that the price should be $180. If we
assume that advance information about the need for a furnace has only distributive
consequences, the costs incurred by sellers to obtain this information has no social
value. See ibid., at pp. 100–103. A rule requiring all sellers both to have their
furnaces checked and to disclose the results is undesirable because it would cause
sellers with high discovery costs to pay more than the information is worth to
anyone. Baird, Gertner and Picker instead propose a rule that any information
gathered must be disclosed, and demonstrate that this rule would have the effect
of preventing anyone from disclosing. Ibid., at p. 102. A rule allowing sellers to
misrepresent the state of their furnaces seems at least as effective and possibly
superior because it entails fewer systemic costs.
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Evolutionary theory may give reason for greater optimism about
division of surplus. Evolutionary theory suggests that humans
may be predisposed to share in ways that facilitate cooperative
bargaining. In particular, if willingness to share the gains of joint
ventures equally with one’s partners increases one’s chances of
forming successful ventures, willingness to share may evolve cultur-
ally or even biologically as a dominant psychological trait.150 The
evolved preference for sharing may in turn enable parties to a partic-
ular bargain to fix more easily on an equal division of surplus. And
in fact, bargaining experiments suggest that, when all else is equal,
partners favor equal division, even when one party is assigned an
entitlement that would allow that party to demand a larger share.151
Yet, even if we assume that humans are disposed to equal sharing,
this preference may give way to other influences in actual nego-
tiations. For example, in bargaining experiments, when conditions
are altered to suggest that the party in control has earned the enti-
tlement to a greater share, the division of gains shifts away from
equality.152 This suggests that in an actual exchange, agreement may
150 Tom Smith describes a population composed of greedy partners who insist
on 2/3, easy partners willing to accept 1/3, and fair partners disposed to equal
division. If successful partners replicate while unsuccessful partners do not, the
distribution of sharing preferences is likely to evolve over time to a stable equilib-
rium of near-universal preference for equal sharing. Smith, supra note 135, at
pp. 104–108. See also ibid., at pp. 110–116 (collecting and explaining materials
on evolution of social skills and dispositions); “Why We’re So Nice: We’re Wired
to Cooperate”, New York Times (Tuesday, July 23, 2002), pp. F1–F8 (reporting
brain imaging studies linking cooperation to reward/pleasure centers in the brain).
151 See Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, “The Coase Theorem: Some
Experimental Tests”, J. L. and Econ. 25 (1982), p. 73 (discussing the results
of ultimatum games in which a coin flip enabled one party either to choose a
fixed sum for himself or to offer to share a slightly larger sum, in proportions
of his choosing, with a partner; subjects chose cooperation and equal division).
Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer, “Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An
Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice”, J. L.
Stud. 14 (1985), pp. 259, 259–261.
152 Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer, “Entitlements, Rights, and Fair-
ness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive
Justice”, supra note 151, at pp. 259, 259–261 (finding that subjects were more
likely to divide gains unequally in ultimatum games when the controlling party
won the right to divide the sum in a competitive game, or when instructions
included an authoritative statement that winning the coin toss meant the controller
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be elusive if both parties have a sense of earned or at least justified
entitlement to the goods or cash they bring to the bargain. Exper-
iments also suggest that the preference for equal division falters
when conditions are manipulated to increase the decision-maker’s
anonymity.153 Thus, in real bargains, a low likelihood of reciprocity
may decrease the chances of a successful division of surplus.154
Parties’ attitudes may also be influenced by the effects of endow-
ment on valuation,155 and by the various irrationalities that affect all
human negotiation.
These various theories of behavior suggest that although cooper-
ation is possible, it will sometimes fail and efficient bargains will
be lost.156 Against this background, a possible benefit of deception
is its capacity to prevent impasses and smooth the way to trade.
Suppose, for example, that a seller falsely maintains that others are
interested in his goods, or that he must demand a certain price in
order to remain in business. As a result, the buyer may form a false
belief that the seller’s offer represents a division of surplus that is
favorable to him, the buyer; and this belief may lead him to buy.157
had earned a right to divide the proceeds). The authors infer that bargainers tend
to be guided by a Lockean norm of distributive justice in cases of earned entitle-
ment (particularly when this norm is reinforced by authority), and otherwise are
guided by a norm of equality. Ibid., at pp. 280–284. They also suggest that these
norms of distributive justice can help parties solve bargaining problems. Ibid., at
p. 297.
153 In other words, sharing may diminish with “social distance.” See Elizabeth
Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith, “Social Distance and Other-
Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games”, Am. Econ. Rev. 86 (1996), p. 653
(refining dictator games and finding, with qualifications, that the resulting
data were “generally supportive of the economic assumption of self-interested
behavior”).
154 See ibid., at p. 658 (suggesting that expectations of reciprocity account for
sharing).
155 See, e.g., Forest Jourden and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “Remedies and the
Psychology of Ownership”, Vand. L. Rev. 51 (1998), p. 1541.
156 See Robert Cooter, “The Cost of Coase”, J. L. Stud. 11 (1982), pp. 1, 14–24,
28 (finding the Coase Theorem too optimistic about bargaining and the “Hobbes
Theorem” too pessimistic).
157 Research on advertising suggests not only that puffing by sellers is effective
in making sales, but also that buyers continue to believe the seller’s exaggeration
even if it is not warranted by the actual quality of the product. See Richard L.
Oliver, “An Interpretation of the Attitudinal and Behavioral Effects of Puffing”, J.
DECEPTION IN MORALITY AND LAW 445
Similarly, a buyer may falsely assert that he cannot and will not
buy above a certain price. If the seller believes this and believes
accordingly that he has done well in the division of surplus, he
will sell. Of course, if these bargaining strategies distort beliefs to
the point at which either party is wrong in thinking that the basic
exchange – cash for goods – will benefit him, they are economically
undesirable. Short of that point, however, deception may actually
help to overcome various combinations of self-interest, uncertainty,
and inflated or irrational valuation that prevent agreement within the
realm of dividing surplus.
It is at least possible that this intuition has affected the law. Legal
rules that allow puffing and treat statements about value as unworthy
of reliance can be explained as facilitating division of surplus. Simi-
larly, the requirement of materiality, to the extent it remains in
force, gives courts an opportunity to permit minor deal-facilitating
deception without affecting the fundamentals of the exchange.
A final point is that customary tolerance of deception, which as
we have noted is often incorporated by legal rules, provides some
evidence that deception can be efficient. Some legal rules refer to
norms of vigilance by potential victims of deception; these norms
say nothing about the efficiency of deception, but only about how
best to minimize harm. Some legal rules, however, refer to custom to
identify instances of permissible deception. For example, comments
to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts cite “the propensity of
sellers and buyers to exaggerate” the value of their offers as a
consideration to be taken into account in determining when a false
statement should be deemed a statement of opinion, on which the
victim should not have relied.158 In other words, sellers and buyers
have developed a practice of deceiving one another and the law
tracks rather than suppresses that practice.
There is reason to think that under some conditions, behavior
sanctioned by custom will tend to maximize welfare. Customs
Consumer Affairs 13 (1979), p. 8 (suggesting that puffery creates high expecta-
tions that cannot easily be disproved and also affects subsequent evaluations of a
product).
158 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §168, comment d (1981); see Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts §539, comment c (1977) (employing a similar standard).
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incorporate experience and localized knowledge.159 Presumably,
groups will converge over time on those practices that bring their
members the greatest success. Of course, convergence does not in
itself indicate efficiency. If customary practices have costs that fall
on outsiders, their endorsement by insiders does not make them
desirable from a universal point of view. If, however, the costs
of the practice are borne reciprocally by members of the group,
group acceptance may be evidence of efficiency.160 Extending this
reasoning to deception, some deceptive practices that are customary
within groups are surely designed to benefit insiders at the expense
of unsuspecting outsiders.161 Similarly, some widespread patterns
of deception target strangers whom the deceiver is unlikely to
159 See Francesco Parisi, “Customary Law”, in Peter K. Newman (ed.), New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (1998), pp. 572, 577; Friedrick
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960), pp. 61–62.
160 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, “Customary Practices and the Law of Torts”,
in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, supra note 159, at p. 579;
see also Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
(1991) (demonstrating the ability of member of a close-knit group to generate
mutually beneficial cooperative norms); Robert D Cooter, “Book Review”, Cal. L.
Rev. 81 (1993), p. 425 (reviewing Ellickson and explaining connections between
the structure of interaction and the efficiency of norms that emerge); Robert
D. Cooter, “Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law”, Int’l Rev. L. and Econ. 14 (1994), p. 215 (arguing that norms
are efficient when they evolve in a context in which individual incentives for
signaling align with public good). Not all accept that customs indicate efficiency.
Eric Posner, for example, asserts that the link between social norms and efficiency
is “empirically false and methodologically sterile.” Posner, supra note 134, at
p. 172. Posner suggests that optimal behavior in two-party repeat play does not
generalize well to multi-party games, that the value of signaling through compli-
ance with norms is indeterminate, and that norms that form in interactions with
strangers are likely to respond to coincidental focal points. See ibid., at pp. 171–
179. Entrenched customs may also fail to respond to changed circumstances. To
arguments of this kind, Epstein responds that, while customary behavior may
not be optimal, it has advantages over judicial rule-making. In particular, courts
focus on particular past acts rather than future patterns of behavior, and the parties
arguing before them lack incentives to argue for the most efficient rule. Epstein,
supra.
161 For example, Michael Darby and Edi Karni analyze incentives for merchants
who provide both diagnosis and service to sell customers services they do not
need. Darby and Karni, supra note 127, at pp. 68–77.
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encounter again.162 In these cases the fact that the practice is
common says nothing in its favor. But when a pattern of decep-
tion arises among parties who interact repeatedly with one another,
the custom itself may provide some ground for thinking that the
deception it allows will facilitate beneficial trade or other social
interchange.
To sum up, deception, and sometimes lying, may have social and
economic benefits. Some of the possibilities we have listed are spec-
ulative, but others are concrete and fairly uncontroversial. Moreover,
these benefits provide plausible explanations for a variety of legal
rules that tolerate deceptive practices, in come cases more plausible
than high cost or reliance on informal enforcement. To the extent
that social and economic benefit is the motive behind legal rules
governing deception, law evidently has departed in principle as well
as in practice from deontological moral theory. It also has arrived at
conclusions that differ from those of leading consequentialists.
C. A Further Conclusion: Legal Doctrine and Legal Rhetoric
Our analysis of legal rules governing deception suggests that legal
doctrine diverges significantly from moral theory, particularly non-
consequentialist moral theory. The pattern of doctrinal requirements
and omissions is at odds with deontological theories that hold
lying to be either inherently wrong or in violation of the victim’s
autonomy. Law is surely concerned with maintaining trust, but
legal rules fall short of the demands of moral theorists who focus
on trust. On close analysis, law appears to be oriented toward
social consequences, ready to trade off control of deception against
other goals and values, and perhaps willing to pursue benefits from
deception.
Nevertheless, as we noted at the outset of our discussion of law,
legal rhetoric broadly condemns deception. A first glance at legal
sources, including cases, statutes, treatises, and black letter compila-
tions, gives the impression of a strong prohibition that sweeps in all
forms of deceptive conduct. To understand the extent to which law
tolerates deception, one must seek out doctrinal details and reflect
162 An example might be lying on resumes. According to a Time Magazine
report, a survey conducted by a firm specializing in background checks found
that 44% of resumes contained lies. Time Magazine (June 10, 2002), p. 45.
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on the practical application of law to daily life. Some of the limita-
tions imposed on legal liability are difficult to appreciate without
considerable research and legal expertise. For example, a seller’s
false assertion that his goods are “worth $10,000” is not an action-
able misrepresentation, but to arrive at this conclusion, one must
first learn that (1) no liability follows from a false statement unless
the listener “justifiably” relied; (2) reliance on most statements of
opinion is deemed to be unreliable; and (3) a claim about value is
deemed to be a statement of opinion.163
In our earlier discussion of deception within the legal system,
we noted other areas of law in which broad legal propositions are
qualified by less salient doctrinal and remedial details.164 Criminal
laws may be enacted in comprehensive terms but narrowed by lesser
known defenses and procedural filters such as prosecutorial discre-
tion.165 Contract law may assert that promisors are entitled to the
benefit of their bargains, and yet remedial rules permit courts to
limit redress.166 In each case, the rules prominently stated as rules
of conduct differ from the rules actually applied by courts to decide
disputes. The law governing deception appears to follow a similar
pattern.
One possible reason for divergence between rhetoric and doctrine
is that law aspires to regulatory ideals it cannot fulfill. Society may
be opposed to deception, but unable eliminate it through law. Rather
than admit failure and give up the ideal of truthfulness, judges
and legal commentators continue to speak as if comprehensive
regulation is possible.167
Another, less benign possibility is that law states ideals it cannot
fulfill in order to create the impression that these ideals describe the
law actually enforced by courts. Society may oppose deception but
lack the means to regulate it in all its forms. To preserve spontaneous
163 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§168 and illus. 2, 169 (1981).
164 See notes 120–124 and accompanying text, supra.
165 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 121.
166 See notes 120–122 and accompanying text, supra. Indeed, Robert Hillman
has identified at least three more general propositions of contract law that are
confidently stated by courts and commentators but are not borne out by judicial
decisions. See Hillman, supra note 109.
167 See Hillman, supra note 109, at p. 515–517.
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norms of truthfulness and deter defectors, law overstates the extent
of its powers.
Yet another, darker possibility is that legal rhetoric diverges from
doctrine when law is in fact ambivalent. Society may take a mixed
view of deception, and yet stand to benefit from public belief that
deception is prohibited by law. Accordingly, legal sources state what
appear to be strong rules against deception and allow the various
qualifications to those rules to remain obscure.168
The special importance and characteristics of the norm of truth-
fulness lend some plausibility to this last interpretation in the
context of laws regulating deception. Truthfulness is a delicate
norm. Suppose that most members of a society value mutual trust
and are disposed to do what they can to protect it. If a critical propor-
tion of the population is truthful, particular acts of deception will
damage trust, not only directly but also by setting bad examples and
suggesting that the norm is not widely observed. Accordingly, those
who value trust have reason to avoid deception. If, however, decep-
tion is rampant, then one further act of deception does no harm, and
no one has reason to forego immediate self-interest in the interest
of trust. Thus, the strength of the norm is essential, not only to trust
but to preservation of the norm itself. Legal sources can reinforce the
norm by repeating the standard of truth and suggesting – deceptively
– that deception will meet consistently with legal sanctions.
A further complication, peculiar to deception, is that to the extent
deception has benefits in the form of civility, privacy, or efficiency,
these benefits also rely on the norm of truthfulness. If nothing is
believed, deception will never be successful. In other words, general
acceptance of the basic norm of truthfulness is essential both to
trust and to successful deception. Therefore, if society is ambivalent
about truthfulness, in the sense that it finds some instances of decep-
tion to be desirable, it has a further reason to assert that truth is
imperative.
168 In this section we sometimes speak of the law as doing things and having
motives. We do not mean to imply that diabolical officials are consciously
designing law to operate in deceptive ways in furtherance of intended ends. We
simply mean that law has evolved in these ways, and that, either coincidentally or
causally, the final product serves the ends we describe.
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Thus: if society wishes, through its legal system, to promote truth
and minimize deception, it needs to exaggerate the capacity of the
legal system to regulate deception. If, in addition, society wishes to
take advantage of certain benefits arising from successful deception,
it has even more reason to condemn deception and exaggerate the
legal system’s capacity to regulate. Viewed in this way, the law
governing deception, with its broad proscription and many loop-
holes, is an exercise in institutionalized collective self-deception.
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